

Chapter 4 (*Inequality, Crisis and Social Change in Indonesia*, T.Reuter [ed.], London & New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003)

Art and Peace in the Safest Place in the World: A Culture of Apoliticism in Bali

Graeme MacRae

Returning to Bali in June 1998, a few days after the tumultuous events culminating in the downfall of President Suharto, I expected to find traces of these events in the form of economic stress and public apprehension, mixed perhaps with relief. I was surprised, however, to find most of my friends in Ubud hastening to reassure me that all was well. The trouble had all been in Java and other places, but 'Bali was perfectly *aman*' (secure). On further questioning it transpired that the explanation for this anomalous state of affairs was that the people of Bali and especially Ubud, unlike those of other parts of Indonesia, had been performing the correct forms of ritual with exceptional diligence. Indeed, they said, my arrival was fortuitously timed; they were at this very moment preparing for series of ceremonies of unprecedented scale to ensure the well-being (*kesejahteraan*) not only of Ubud but of all Bali and even the whole world.¹

What my friends were telling me clearly contradicted information I had received from other sources that there had in fact been (albeit relatively minor) demonstrations in Denpasar. Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the late President Sukarno and Vice-President of Indonesia at the time of writing, but in mid-1998 the leader of a major opposition party (the PDI-P) and her entourage had been in Bali and had even passed through Ubud a few days previously with much fanfare. Within a few days of my arrival the entire Provincial parliament (DPRD) had stepped down in the face of mounting public pressure. Despite this dominant discourse of denial, there were a few people who admitted that it had been pretty scary. One man, who had lost family and friends in the 1965 massacres, said privately that the events and particularly the whole 'feeling' of it had taken him back to the atmosphere of those days. Months later, as the 1999 elections loomed, I received a message from a foreign expatriate, resident in Ubud, expressing the sentiment that

¹ Ceremonies of broadly similar *krisis*-averting intent were also organized by local government and PHDI at various major temples around Bali at this time. (Bali Post 10.6.98, 11.6.98, 27.6.98)

I only wish the Balinese were more politically savvy and more socially active. Their vision is so myopic. The ceremonies must go on.

I arrived again in late 1999, this time a few days after an unprecedented afternoon of rioting in which roads were blocked and government buildings destroyed simultaneously in several district centers in Bali in protest against the non-election of Megawati as President. By now I was no longer surprised that once again the main concern was less with the political issues themselves than with the fact that Ubud and indeed all of the Gianyar had remained immune to the disorder. The reason for this extraordinary immunity? The regency (*kabupaten*) government of Gianyar, of which a member of Puri (the royal household of) Ubud was head, had recently performed an elaborate public ceremony of sacrifice (*mecaru*) to purify the region of malign influences. When questioned about the election, most people expressed satisfaction with the ultimate outcome but hastened to add that their concerns were not with politics but with religion (*agama*) and that tourism and economic growth not be disrupted.

In the weeks that followed, the majority of people I met in the streets of Ubud, in other parts of Bali and as far afield as Lombok, were concerned less with the national political situation as such (and even less with East Timor) than with its effects upon tourism. Of the two sentiments most commonly expressed one was summarized eloquently by the well-fed and gold-bedecked young proprietor of a car-hire establishment in Ubud: "This president, that president - it is all the same to me as long as tourists keep coming and we can make a living", and the other, more succinctly by various persons of less worldly persuasion: "We are interested in religion not politics."

In previous years (especially 1993-1996) when I had attempted to warn people of what I perceived as the long-term economic risks associated with over-dependence on tourism, the message had fallen on deaf ears - people listened politely and thanked me for my advice, but the glazed look in their eyes told me that they pitied my inability to comprehend the ritual causation of the inexorable economic cycle through which prosperity was brought by tourism.² Now there was no longer any need for my sanctimonious warnings. Despite the public *mecaru*, and no doubt plenty of private offerings, everybody understood the process in only too material terms: "If there are no tourists, how will we be able to eat?"

What was strikingly apparent was that most people were expressing the causal relationship between tourism and ritual in more direct form than I had heard it before. While they saw tourism in particular and business in general as compatible with religion, they saw both in

² This conception of economic causation is explained in my thesis (1997:144-5).

implacable opposition to “politics”. While they had no illusions about the effects of the political turmoil on their own livelihoods, and were prepared to make ritual investment to minimize these affects, the implicit feeling was that Ubud / Gianyar had remained free of such turmoil and they were being unfairly penalized for the activities of a politicized minority located elsewhere - somewhere - anywhere, except in Ubud.

Why, during these times when things were clearly the furthest from *aman* they had been in the living memory of most people were they so busy trying to create the impression that everything was safe and secure? At one level this concern to suppress any hint of violence or disorder makes sense in relation to keeping tourism on track. Tourist numbers were (in mid-1998) clearly down (especially the seasonal and high-spending Americans and Japanese) and inflation was running at nearly 35%. So everyone was understandably concerned to maintain the contrary impression that everything was fine; business as usual, ritual as usual. In 1999 the Rupiah had recovered considerable ground but tourist numbers were down again (especially Australians in the wake of anti-Australian sentiment following the UN occupation of East Timor). Investment and development, however, were continuing regardless, though ordinary people seemed more aware of their dependence on tourism and their vulnerability to political and economic instability.³

But I suspect there is more to it than this. The way locals were trying to suppress the bad news, any hint of violence or disorder, any hint of the political, rang a few bells for me. Throughout my (1993-6) fieldwork in Ubud I found most people very happy to talk about all sorts of things until it came to the dark side; violence, disorder or anything to do with politics. There are two obvious explanations for such an attitude. One is the often cited pan-Southeast Asian interpersonal style in which polite circumlocution is raised to the level of art to avoid overt conflict or confrontation of less than comfortable realities. Unni Wikan has described in some detail the distinctively Balinese version of this mode of communication (1990:82-106, see also H. Geertz 1995:12). The other is the obvious fact that Indonesia is, or certainly was until 1988, a country where careless talk about politics could get you into a lot of trouble. State ideology throughout the New Order period sought to sanitize local culture of any traces of the political (Acciaioli 1985, Hooker 1995:5) and barely concealed behind the ideology lay the willingness of the state to enforce such

³ Figures (obtained from Kantor Kepolisian Sektor Ubud) for 1998 were down by about 16% and had continued to fall each month until November 1999. The streets, shops and restaurants were obviously much quieter than normal, traders were unanimous in their belief that this was so and the operators of small tourist-dependent businesses were showing signs of distress.

policies by terror and violence. Consequently a certain reticence about the political has been noted by researchers in other parts of Indonesia. As John Pemberton puts it “the word *politik* is marked by a sinister tonality acquired after the political killings of the mid-1960s” (1994:4) and Indonesia during the late New Order period was home to “an uncanny stillness [...] when it comes to political matters” (1994:2), maintained by “an ambiguous, internalized form of repression that makes the apparent normality of everyday life conceivable, desirable” (1994:7, see also Steedly 1993:225).⁴

Both of these explanations are to a degree linked to Benedict Anderson’s (1995) argument regarding traditional Javanese conceptions of worldly power as an inherent property, of supernatural origin, which some people are able to accumulate in greater quantity than others. When combined with a view of historical process as cyclical and divinely ordained, political power and social inequality are thus seen as aspects of the natural order to which neither moral critique nor political resistance are appropriate or realistic responses. There is, in the political thinking of Ubud people, evidence of all of these factors but not sufficiently to explain the elevation of an understandable reticence into a positive cultural value. People I knew well, who would talk to me about all sorts of things, would (with a few notable exceptions) simply clam up, even in private, when it came to the events of 1965 or even to contemporary politics, local, provincial or national. More politically aware friends from other parts of Bali concurred in this judgement of Ubud to the point of questioning my choice to work in such an artificially depoliticized and culturally conservative environment.

The primary task of this paper is neither to pass judgement on this attitude, nor to suggest that it is unique to Ubud, Bali or even Indonesia⁵, but to explain, or at least understand this ‘culture of apoliticism’, by placing it in an historical context. A secondary task is to consider the effects on this culture of the recent crisis and repoliticization of public life throughout Indonesia. Finally, linking the two is an examination of the role of the arts in maintaining and perhaps ultimately changing this culture.

Kamis Kelabu: the public reponse.

⁴ This interiorization of repression began in the state education system, where students were left with a profound sense of social unease and embarrassment at the public discussion of religious or ethnic differences within the nation (Kadek Newson, pers.com.)

⁵ As an anonymous reviewer pointed out a hypothetical Indonesian ethnographer in Australia might reasonably draw parallel conclusions about the role of irreligious hedonistic materialism in Australian culture.

In late 1999, as the proprietors of the empty shops and restaurants of Ubud reflected dolefully on their own imminent starvation as a result of the lack of tourists, while in the coastal resorts the lively self-help cottage industries of petty crime, drug-dealing and prostitution expanded to fill the economic vacuum left by the receding tide of tourism,⁶ the shocked silence following the riots of “Ash Thursday” (Kamis Kelabu) of 21 October was gradually replaced by a chorus of public lamentation and recrimination tempered eventually with a modicum of analysis. The pages of the main local newspaper, the Bali Post (BP), served as a focal point of this discussion and provide a record of it. The following summary of the main themes of this discussion is based on an analysis of more than 50 articles published over the period 2.11.99 to 13.12.99.

The initial reaction was shock and disbelief that such a thing could occur in Bali which, as everyone knows, is “the safest place in the world” (BP 8.11.99), followed by a profound sense of “shame” or “embarrassment” (*malu*) (8.11.99). All but one writer accepted the rather demeaning, and less than enlightening, media stereotype of the incident as “mass madness” (*amuk massa*) (23.11.99).⁷ While nobody questioned that the catalyst for the riots had been the failure of the national assembly (MPR) to elect Megawati (the preferred candidate by many Balinese) as President, explanations of underlying causes quickly bifurcated into two main directions.

On one hand was the hypothesis of a knee-jerk reaction, neither new nor surprising in itself, but articulated unashamedly by such public figures as the head of Parisada Hindu Dharma (PHDI, the umbrella organization of Indonesian Hinduism) and a well-known psychiatrist; seeking to pin the blame onto “newcomers” bringing “new values” which seek to “destroy the solidarity” of the religious faithful in Bali (*ada pendatang yang membawa “nilai baru” yang berusaha merusak kerukunan umat beragama di Bali*, BP 4.11.99). Even an eminent

⁶ I am aware that this reference may be offensive to some readers, the more so for its lack of substantiation. It is based upon my own impressions of one night as a single male in Kuta in November 1999 which confirmed anecdotal evidence from a number of expatriate residents, an article in Jakarta Post (November 1999) on the incidence of disguised prostitution among young Balinese women running *warung* in Denpasar, and subsequent reading of press reports from various sources.

⁷ It has been suggested to me (Tim Behrend pers. com. 2000) that I should be wary of dismissing the concept of “amuk” as an explanatory category, deeply ingrained as it is in Javanese and Balinese thought. In this context however, a publication in Bahasa Indonesia, catering primarily to the literate middle-class, whose overt cultural traditionalism is mixed with rational-modernist attitudes to such primitivist excesses of village religion as trance possession, the reference seems clearly to be a label serving a categorizing and sensationalizing rather than an explanatory function.

historian, reminding Balinese that their society had a long tradition of trusted residents of non-Balinese origin and that it was as much in the interests of such contemporary residents as it was of indigenous Balinese to maintain public order, did not question that what they were defending against was “intervention by outsiders” (BP 10.11.99b). This assumption continued in the form of ongoing references to presumed “provocateurs” repeated without supporting evidence by cultural commentators and local politicians and even a lawyer (BP 8.11.99, 9.11.99b). While not everybody joined this chorus of xenophobia, the only dissenting voices were two local anthropologists who, while not referring directly to this discourse, independently referred to the need for Balinese to develop a more “tolerant”, “flexible” and “pluralistic” political culture (BP 23.11.99a, 1.12.99).

On the other hand many Balinese saw the riots as cause for self-reflection and sober reassessment of their relationship with such fundamental traditional values as “respect” and “trust” (BP 23.11.99b). Some saw the problem simply as evidence of the domination of politics over religion (BP 1.12.99) or the “weakness of the spiritual contribution in political activity” (BP 2.11.99). The local government of Badung, the district most severely affected by both the riots themselves and the subsequent drop in tourism, implicitly accepting a *niskala* (invisible, spiritual) cause-and-effect chain to be behind the events, performed two large public rituals of purification (BP 7.12.99).⁸ However, when a foreign resident and “teacher of yoga and meditation from India” suggested (BP 19.11.99) that this may be a sign of a coming cultural-religious “calamity”, accused Balinese of “extraordinary hypocrisy” in their worship of material prosperity under the guise of Hinduism, and claimed that the gods had already deserted several major temples in Bali, there was an outcry of protest, expressed in the form of letters to the editor, drowning out a more muted recognition that he may have had a point (BP 29.11.99).⁹

As the economic consequences of the global perception of Bali’s fall from grace became apparent, in the form of a rash of cancellations of tour and hotel bookings and a significant drop in overall tourist numbers, rendered all the more galling by the gains made by Thailand and Singapore at Bali’s expense (BP 4.11.99, 10.11.99, Jakarta Post

⁸ The “haunting sense of incompleteness so pervasive of New Order cultural discourse has the effect ... of motivating an almost endless production of offerings, a constant reiteration of things cultural, in an attempt to make up for what may have been left out in the process of recovering tradition” (Pemberton 1994:11).

⁹ In Ubud, the teacher runs an ashram and a restaurant, the partners in which told me that they had been greatly embarrassed by his statements from which they were at considerable pains to disassociate themselves. They hinted also that he would be well-advised not to show his face in Ubud for some time.

25.11.99), the tourist industry went into a frenzy of damage-control public relations activity (BP 23.11.99, JP 25.11.99, Santikarma 1999), punctuated by calls for assistance from central government in their hour of need (BP 4.11.99a) and for speedy repair of the material damage (BP 2.12.99b). It also reminded others of Bali's need for development of the non-tourism sectors of its economy (BP 25.11.99). By the time I left Bali in mid-December 1999, there appeared to be an emergent consensus among more reflective observers to the effect that the riots were a symptom neither of "outside provocateurs" nor a fall from religious grace on the part of Balinese, but a spontaneous popular outpouring of resentment against such things as "unjust behavior which the people have received and internalized for too long" (BP 2.12.99a, see also 4.11.99b), "public disillusionment" in general (11.11.99, 3.12.99) or specifically with economics, politics and the maintenance of the rule of law (28.11.99), or feelings of "marginalization" on the part of sectors of the community (4.11.99b, 23.11.99). More than one observer raised the possibility of a repeat of the disturbances if the underlying causes were not addressed (BP 15.11.99, 1.12.99, 3.12.99).

These views, from a relatively wide cross-section of Balinese society (at least the literate, newspaper-subscribing segment of it), appear at first more complex and diverse than the Ubud ones discussed above. On closer inspection, however, they seem to me to repeat, in various guises, essentially of the same themes. Firstly, the shocked reaction to the realization that contemporary Balinese reality simply did not conform to its tourism image indicated the extent to which Balinese had come to believe that image, and the depth of collective amnesia with regard to the dark and violent aspects of their own history (as documented by Robinson 1995) and of earlier images of Bali (Vickers 1989:11-36). Secondly, the assumption that anything violent, disorderly or even "political" must originate elsewhere and outside Bali restates an Ubud orthodoxy on a larger scale. Thirdly, the call for a return to cultural / religious / spiritual values repeats, in modified form, the implicit opposition between the religious and the political, in other words an apolitical conception of Balinese culture. Finally, the concern over the damage to the tourism economy reflects the extent to which economics and politics are separated in mainstream Balinese thinking, with the former compatible and the latter incompatible with traditional values.

This leaves only the theme of political-economic critique, the implicit thrust of which runs counter to the other themes clearly emergent in the Bali Post debate but not yet evident in Ubud, except among a small minority who tend not to express their views publicly. We will return to this later, but for the moment let us concentrate on the themes common to Ubud and Bali Post. What I want to do in the rest of this paper is to explore what might be described as a "culture of apoliticism" in Ubud with a view to casting some light on the position

of Bali as a whole in the apparently repoliticized public culture of Indonesia. My argument is that while aspects of such an ethos may be found elsewhere in Indonesia and especially in Bali, their peculiar and systematic development in Ubud become intelligible in the context of a specific history of relationships between the local community and wider political and economic processes. To demonstrate this involves trawling through some familiar material, rereading with an eye for the (a)political.¹⁰

Paradise without Politics

While recent scholarship has made a large shift from the cultural / aesthetic toward the political / economic aspects of Bali, there are two other places where this radically apolitical approach to Balinese culture and history may be found other than among its participants. The first is in the images of Bali created by foreigners from the 1920s until very recently and which is immortalized in the rhetoric of the tourist industry. The second is in the images contained in Balinese art, or at least the more public and popular forms of art.

The creation of the Paradise-image began with the Dutch public relations campaign to cover the blood-stained traces of their own acquisition of the island, by advertising Bali as a cultural relic of ancient Hindu civilization and a nice place to go for an exotic holiday into the bargain (Vickers 1989:91).

Gregor Krause, a German doctor whose photographs brought the first images of Balinese village life to Europe, set off the first Trans-Atlantic Bali-craze. Walter Spies, the cosmopolitan, Covarrubias and all the other Euro-American glitterati of the 1920s/30s saw the natural beauty, the gentle grace of the people, the cooperative organization of *banjar*, *desa*, *subak* and other traditional organizations, the religious ideas and practices, the arts, in short, all the beautiful and harmonious aspects of Balinese social life. What they were themselves hiding from was not the darker side of Balinese history but of their own history: In the wake of WW1 and political violence in Europe, the image they were creating of Bali was a mirror-image of everything they wanted to get away from (Fussell 1980:3-8, MacRae 1992, Pollman

¹⁰ This paper is based primarily upon fieldwork in Ubud, in 1993-4 and 1996, which is reported in detail in my Ph.D. thesis (1997). This research was conducted under the auspices of L.I.P.I. with the local sponsorship of Dr. I Ny. Erewan of U.N.U.D. and financial assistance from the University of Auckland and an APEC Research Scholarship. Some of the matters discussed here were developed in the context of conversations with many people including I W. Darta of Ubud, A.A. Ardi and Diana Darling of Tegalsuci, Melody Kemp of Sayan and the late I G.M. Sumung and his sons. I am grateful also to Hildred Geertz and Adrian Vickers for comments on the relevant parts of my thesis and to three anonymous reviewers for the publisher.

1990:7, Vickers 1989:98). Their determination to do so led to some wonderful, if somewhat romantic popular ethnography and photography. But it also created a kind of blinkered vision which enabled them to simply filter out the subtle violence inherent in maintaining colonial order and the devastating economic and social effects of the Depression on the newly monetarized economy (Pollman 1990:12-20, Robinson 1995). Even the professional anthropologists who worked during this era and on its social fringes seemed oblivious to the *political* realities which conditioned what they interpreted as manifestations of Balinese *culture* (Mead and Bateson, Pollman 1990:20-21).

This was also the time when tourism began to play a part in the local economy and culture. This tourism involved a collaboration between the expatriate glitterati and the Ubud royal family and it emphasized two things; religion and, especially, the arts:

the Balinese are the greatest artists of this age [...] every Balinese [...] is an artist. [...] life centers around [...] religion, a beautiful mixture of animism and Hinduism [...]. Whether sculpture, painting, music or dancing, they simply had to [...] they could not help themselves. (Roosevelt 1985:x-xii)

The image on which tourism was based portrayed Balinese as people living in elegant material simplicity - a kind of exotic voluntary poverty - because their real concerns were with the finer things of life, the arts and the gods, rather than grubbing for money. The implication was that they were not concerned with politics either; they were content with any stable political order whether provided by the aristocracy or the Dutch.

The Art of the Apolitical

Sixty years on a new expat-glitterati hold court in Ubud. Amid the tropico-cosmopolitan cool of the opening of an exhibition of paintings by a mixed (middle-class Balinese and expatriate) group of artists in 1996, an expatriate non-artist turned to me and whispered "If I have to look at another painting of rice fields, sunsets, beautiful women or happy families (*keluarga bahagia*) I think I'll vomit". This person subscribes to the view that the proper function of art is to address the real political, social and economic issues and believes that Indonesian art in general and Balinese art in particular conspicuously fail to do so. This observation inspired me to make a brief survey of the contents of the three great galleries in Ubud.¹¹

¹¹ I record here my debt to this person while leaving him/her anonymous.

The oldest, Puri Lukisan is located in the center of town, in spacious gardens between the main road and rice fields on land donated by a branch of the Puri Ubud. It consists of several pavilions housing the definitive collection of the works of the 'Pita Maha' group. It is the legacy of the glitterati-*puri* collaboration of the 1930s, especially that between the Dutch expatriate artist Rudolf Bonnet, Cokorda Agung (the great ruler of) Sukawati, and the artists themselves. After some years of neglect its buildings have recently been restored and new standards of curatorship and management established.

Museum Neka was established in 1982 by a local schoolteacher turned shopkeeper turned art dealer turned art collector and promoter. Its collection is broader, consisting primarily of more recent paintings of Balinese themes by both local and foreign artists as well as a general collection of contemporary Indonesian art.

The *Agung Rai Museum of Art* (ARMA) was opened with national-level fanfare in 1996. It is the *opus magnum* of one of the most successful schoolboy-entrepreneurs of the 1970s and combines an art collection with teaching and performing facilities, hotel and restaurant. Its collection is smaller but similar in scope to that of Neka.¹²

Each museum contains several hundred works and my brief survey tends to confirm my friend's jaundiced assessment of the state of Balinese art. A cluster of three adjacent and recent paintings in the Neka Museum give some idea of the flavor and are by no means atypical. *Life in Bali* by Ny. Lusug (1988) is a classically panoramic scene of idyllic village life incorporating women weaving, fighting cocks in cages, market trade in agricultural products, people collecting water and fishing in the river, and a fairly grand cremation complete with elaborate ritual paraphernalia - all against a background of farming activities. *Villagers* by N. Tulus (1994) depicts a very similar range of activities, minus the cremation. I. B. Taman's *Bustling Village* (1979) is almost identical in subject matter. There is nothing in their content to distinguish them from Gregor Krause's photographs from 1912. Works by non-Balinese artists in all three galleries are distinguishable only by style rather than content from the works of locals.

The realities of economic survival appear only in the form of romanticized images of traditional agricultural production and village markets. Poverty and social inequality are obscured by images of communal labor and ritual solidarity. Political conflict appears only in the mythologized form of episodes from the Hindu epics in which the

¹² There are in fact other significant collections around Ubud, most notably that of the Rudana Gallery in Peliatan, but these three are generally acknowledged to be the main ones and their owners are all major players in the political-economy of Ubud. The story of the wonderfully Balinese blend of competition and co-operation between them remains to be told.

practitioners and / or victims of violence are mostly supernatural beings.

The very few images in these museums which bear any relation to contemporary reality are of a deceptively light-hearted genre introduced during the colonial era, with temple carvings incorporating overweight Dutch policemen driving motor vehicles or violating local maidens (Covarrubias 1994:186). The most celebrated contemporary practitioner of this mode is W. Bendi whose paintings incorporate the paraphernalia of tourism: foreign visitors, cameras, cars, surfers, airplanes. The forms, composition and overall effects, however, are almost identical to those of the village scenes described above; only some of the ingredients are changed. Even his *The War of Independence* (1986) the artist follows this same format but incorporates a few Dutch soldiers and a surprisingly cosmopolitan array of photographers, including one of brown skin but long nose and another who appears Indonesian. The effect is, like the tourist scenes, of simply another busy day in the village with the villagers dressed in uniforms and carrying guns instead of hoes.¹³

Discussion of the arts of Bali is a productive enterprise almost as rich and varied as the arts themselves.¹⁴ I am competent to add little to this discussion beyond the observation that, with a very few striking exceptions (notably Vickers 1989:143-6 and his forthcoming publications), it neither mentions any evidence of art containing overtly political, economic and social commentary nor does it comment upon this striking absence in a society subject to extraordinary change and elements of considerable conflict.

In a recent publication subtitled *Images of Bali in the Arts*, Garret Kam mentions without comment that the colorful "New Artist" style in

¹³ A partial exception to this pattern is M.Budi's, *President Suharto and his wife visit Bali* (1987). At first glance the form is essentially the same but the effect is less harmonious, more subtly sinister. The President is standing, dressed in an ill-tailored western suit of lurid pinkish hue, on a podium addressing an audience neither visible nor implied in picture. The only local people visible are a couple of farmers trying to get on with the business of supporting themselves while a reporter tries to interview them. Dancers and gamelan perform and the first lady, in traditional costume, is amused by the frog dancers. Po-faced dignitaries sit in a pavilion behind the president. Security guards in full commando gear swarm everywhere. A telecommunications tower is erected on top of a semi-Balinese looking building. The background is mountain landscape. This painting, the only one of which I am aware which addresses contemporary political issues in a way which leaves room for critical interpretation, would appear to offer a point of departure for a student in search of such a hidden tradition in modern Balinese painting.

¹⁴ There were, according to an authoritative bibliography (Stuart-Fox:1992) 1151 books and articles on the arts in Bali published between 1920 and 1990.

Penestanan, characterized by bright child-like colors and a quality of “fresh innocence”, flourished in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 massacres, but does not reflect them in any way (1993:57). The same publication contains reproductions of forty, implicitly representative, paintings selected not purely for their artistic merit but to provide an overview of Balinese culture and history (1993:20). They represent, as the main title *Perceptions of Paradise* hints, images of rural landscapes and the idyllic timeless village life, the performance of ritual, scenes from Hindu epic literature. Not one of these painting contains any reference whatsoever to contemporary, or even historical economic or political reality. The only references to conflict or violence are framed unambiguously within mythological settings. The same general comments apply to both the sentiments and the selections illustrated in other works on Balinese painting such as Forge (1978), Rhodius and Darling (1980), and Djelantik (1990).

Ubud artists with whom I have discussed this matter recognize and do not deny the pattern. They explain it in two ways. One is that it is not the business of art to meddle in the affairs of everyday life, but to create a world of beauty and harmony apart from everyday problems. Art is to induce people to feel and behave more peacefully rather than fuelling conflict and ill-will. As one painter (who happens to hold views strongly critical of the cultural and environmental effects of tourism) put it, the last thing he wanted to do with his anger and other negative emotions was to immortalize them in the form of paintings, especially if they were good ones, in which case he, as the artist would be responsible for their negative effects upon other people.

The other category of explanations are along the lines that not only painting but all traditional Balinese art does in fact address all the problems of the *sekala* world. But it does so metaphorically through representation and interpretation of the *niskala* conflicts of the gods and mythological heroes, especially those contained in the great Hindu epics Ramayana and Mahabharata, which are held to contain the solutions to all human problems.

One of the few exceptions to the academic tradition of ignoring this curious aspect of Balinese art is Adrian Vickers, who tends toward the latter of the two Balinese explanations. In his discussion of some of the works of the great artists of the 1930's he reads Lempad's graphic depictions of homosexuality, Deblog's images of violence between supernatural beings, and indeed the popularity of the Rangda-Barong conflict itself as metaphorical commentaries upon a “moral order [...] undergoing rapid change” and “an era of instability [...] in need of exorcism on all levels” (1989:144, 146).

A third, more prosaic explanation, alluded to by some painters themselves and consistent with the predominant political climate of the nation is simply that they are afraid to paint overtly controversial material. They repeat the Ubud orthodoxy that they are not interested in politics and want to get on with their lives in peace.

I have not made parallel inquiries with regard to the performing arts but they appear to be similarly restricted to classical forms, genres and content: endless repetitions of the same dances in both temple ceremonies and tourist performances. There are two partial exceptions among the performing arts; *topeng* and *wayang* (see Kellar, this volume, for a discussion of *arja*). The former are masked dances in which elements of dynastic chronicles (*babad*) are enacted and recited. Although usually performed in ritual contexts, the stories are rich with (mytho-historical) political intrigue and conflict and they are often told in ways which comment obliquely upon contemporary affairs. The same is true, to a greater degree, of *wayang kulit*, in which puppeteer and narrator routinely intersperse the epic sagas they relate with commentaries, usually comical, often bawdy and sometimes disguised, upon contemporary issues, including political ones (Warren 1993:99-100).¹⁵ In these cases the political critique, trenchant as it may be, is subtly phrased and thoroughly embedded, almost hidden in the classical form. I am not aware of any parallel tradition of hidden critique in the graphic arts.

My suspicion that this dominant pattern of cultural apoliticism is no accident is reinforced by the only case I know of an artist who has attempted to challenge it. Made Kertonegoro, an expatriate Javanese artist and performer has lived in Ubud since the mid 1980s. When I first met him in 1988, he was presenting a performance entitled *Release from World Disaster*. It utilized the style and format of traditional Balinese dance drama and was staged by local performers in the village of Petulu Gunung. Its subject matter, however, was the saving of the world from impending destruction through nuclear or environmental holocaust by divine intervention.

He had, he told me, attempted to stage it in a central Ubud venue as part of the regular nightly program of traditional dances and dramatic genres. He was not able to find a venue willing to accommodate his show, however, nor were Ubud performers willing to take part in it. Instead he used performers and a venue in a nearby village, Petulu Gunung. He has also published a series of books which are in various ways critical of the prevailing alliance between apolitical cultural conservatism and the economic interests of tourism. His books, he claims, were "banned" from sale in main-street outlets, although they remain to this day available at a minority of "alternative" outlets. When I last spoke to him he had retired from overt political activism - to concentrate on the spiritual dimensions of his art.

¹⁵ Hildred Geertz in a recent analysis of a series of paintings from Batuan, although not addressing matters of political economy directly, appears to suggest that they refer problems of the ordinary world back to the deeper conflicts of *niskala* forces (1995:2). In a previous work she suggests that in certain circumstances ritual drama may in fact be turned to political uses (1991b). This would appear to be a fruitful point of departure for further research on the arts.

Such is the appearance of an idea, or what some of our predecessors in Bali (Mead and Bateson 1942:xi) might have called an *ethos*; of a radical apoliticism which is not merely an absence but a positive value in the local culture of Ubud. While it is supported by historical and cultural precedent and is compatible with the ethos of cultural tourism, it nevertheless seems remarkable that it should have survived so unscathed through an era in which the economic and cultural orders have in other respects been so radically altered. To understand how this has come to pass, it may be helpful to consider in more detail the history of political thought and action in Ubud for, as Judith Williamson (1978) reminds us,

...ideology embedded in form is the hardest of all to see. This is why it is important to emphasize process [...] it undoes the *fait accompli*.

A Short History of Political Consciousness in Ubud.

In the years immediately prior to 1900 Ubud was arguably the most effective politico-military formation in South Bali. Its royal leadership entered the colonial era with vast landholdings and political influence as well as a rather privileged relationship with the Dutch - the result of Ck. Gede Sukawatis's role as a facilitator of the voluntary hand-over of control of the kingdom of Gianyar (MacRae 1997:340) to the Dutch. After this transition he proved as able a statesman in peace as he had been in war.

By the time the "paradise" image was in full production in the 1920s he was no longer alive, and the most powerful individual in Ubud was his eldest son, Ck. Raka Sukawati. The latter had been to the Dutch school in Probolinggo, trained as a colonial civil servant, and was generally very Dutch-influenced in his thinking and pro-Dutch in his politics. His power relative to that of the artists themselves, based upon traditional respect for (or fear of) the *puri*, was such that he could, at a whim, take from the most famous artist of all, Gusti Nyoman Lempad, his rice fields or his daughter (Vickers 1989:142). Within his own family he was able to out-manuever the combined influence of all his siblings to monopolize the vast majority of his father's considerable inheritance. Contemporary oral sources (which shall remain anonymous) both within and outside the *puri* agree that his control over *niskala* forces through black magic played a considerable part in his ability to manipulate *sekala* affairs to his own advantage.

As Pollman (1990:16) shows, the Dutch cultural policy of the time was one of Balinization; of keeping the overt behavior of Balinese as traditional as possible - or preferably making them even more Balinese

than before - along neo-traditional lines defined not by themselves but by Dutch experts on Balinese culture. This approach was consistent with the cultural politics Ck. Raka practiced in Ubud. There is no evidence from Ubud of any resistance to the Dutch such as occurred occasionally elsewhere in Bali (Robertson 1995:64-69, Wiener 1999:58).

To summarize, there were three major influences operating at the time:

1. That of the Spies-glitterati toward encouraging Balinese to value and commodify traditional art and religion rather than reflecting upon the sources of their grinding poverty.
2. The influence of the Sukawati aristocracy to accept and respect the Dutch regime.
3. The fact that the two most powerful forces in Ubud life, the *sekala* economic and cultural power of the Spies-glitterati and the *niskala* and political power of the Sukawati aristocracy, were closely linked and worked together by giving much the same messages.

These influences together, I think, provide the first layer of understanding of a way of thinking in which art and religion are both separated from politics and given radically opposite valuations. Art and religion were approved by the powers that be as appropriate for ordinary people to be involved in, while politics was taken care of by the *puri* and the Dutch. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, economics are separated from politics and begin to be attached instead to art/religion.

After leading the tour of the Ubud/Peliatan dance group to Europe in 1931 (collecting a French wife en route), and having already stripped his family of much of their wealth, Ck. Raka moved on to national level politics in Batavia, leaving his younger brother Ck. Agung in charge of the *puri*. Ck. Agung was a different personality to Ck. Raka. He was perhaps a product of the cultural and political environment in which he grew up; devoting himself to religion, the arts and his glitterati friends and apparently innocent of political ambition.

The Coming of “Politics”: 1935-1950.

The whole structure began to fall apart in the late 30s when the glitterati were driven out by the Dutch, on the pretext of a moral clean-up (Vickers 1989:124-5). The last straw was the Japanese occupation, when everything was turned on its head. Local people who had previously been involved in various ways with the cultural economy of art and expatriates were suddenly suspect, and they returned to the rice fields and metamorphosed into illiterate farmers. Everything was in short supply and life was reduced to survival.

Politics had come from somewhere else, had got out of hand and was making life difficult.

Ck. Agung had neither taste nor talent for dealing with this. He found himself persecuted by the Japanese who he had naively thought of as his friends because of their interest in art. After the Japanese left the Dutch returned, but for the first time in their lives, the young men who had grown up in the apolitized environment of Ubud, became politicized. Some of them, indeed, became involved in the struggle for *kemerdekaan* (independence).

Ck. Raka chose to ally himself with his brother-in-law A. A. Gede Agung of Puri Gianyar on the side of the federalist N.I.T. and against the republican nationalism to which his younger brother, Ck. Agung, subscribed. Once again Ck. Agung found himself in a difficult situation. The relatives to whom he felt closest were hunted, imprisoned, tortured and in some cases killed by the more politically ambitious of his own relatives (Hilberry 1979:36-39).

After the Republic was formed there were only more economic problems and political unrest. By this time Ck. Agung was thoroughly disillusioned with politics: "...there were so many political parties I was not interested any longer..." (Ck. Agung Sukawati, cited in Hilberry 1979:39). Although he was but one man, his experience is, I think both a metaphor for and representative of the common Ubud experience of politics at this time. His perception of politics was as something, originating elsewhere, which inevitably ended in local suffering. What originated in Ubud by contrast, was art and religion and mutually beneficial relationships with foreigners who were attracted to exactly the same things as their Balinese hosts.

While he avoided formal political office himself, Ck. Agung was the head of the *puri* and was thus seen by most people as the *raja* of Ubud by virtue of inheriting the divine mandate and ritual responsibilities of his father. He was, unlike his brother, something of a man of the people. The gates of his *puri* were open to the people, both of Ubud and beyond, fostering a relationship between *puri* and commoners unparalleled in modern Bali. He is, again unlike his brother, fondly remembered in Ubud as a man embodying the very qualities of apolitical, religious-artistic sentiment that Ubud people like to think of themselves as having. It was during the period of his influence that the present culture of the apolitical was instated as unwritten *puri* policy.

The Politicization of Civil Society: 1950 -1965

One of the effects of the decade of invasion, war and independence struggle was to take politics out of the control of the local or national elite and to involve ordinary people in political debate and action. Throughout Indonesia the 1950s were marked by the irregular

localized violence of *grombolan* and the emergence of a plethora of popular political movements and parties (Robinson 1995).

The effects of this crisis were perhaps less marked in Ubud than in many other places, as the community remained relatively united under the moral authority of the *puri* and isolated from outside influence. It was, however, not isolated from nation-wide economic problems, manifest in shortages and inflation of the prices of basic commodities.

Most people in Ubud who remember this era prefer not to think or, at least, not to talk about it. According to the few people whom I could persuade to discuss it, there was little spontaneous political activity of local origin, but there was a pervasive penetration of the national political turmoil into the area. Small groups of *grombolan* or *logis* (former freedom fighters dissatisfied with the post-independence regime) were active in nearby villages and made nocturnal raids into Ubud, creating an atmosphere of apprehension and mistrust. Local farmers became aware of the nationwide agitation for land reform, which was spearheaded by the communist party (PKI) and especially its agrarian arm BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia).

Later there were active PKI cells in nearby villages. Members visited Ubud regularly, easily recognizable by the long trousers they wore (a sign of advanced political sensibilities) in contrast to the traditional *kamben* (waist cloth) worn by village men. They would swagger around the village, boasting about the imminent downfall of traditional institutions such as the *puri* and traditional religion, saying "there is no god - only the machines which produce food" and promising land to those who joined the party. On occasions they organized public rallies, in which local people participated, as much it is said for the entertainment than out of any real understanding of the party's manifesto. Many farmers, however, (according to a man of reputed PKI sympathies) joined BTI and most others secretly supported PKI's objectives of agrarian reform.

The *landreform* process began in 1963-4, with the local *perbekel* (village head) merely acting as point of contact for officials from elsewhere who collected information. According to his recollection, the process proceeded smoothly with the owners of excess land, all *puri* members or close dependants, cooperating with officials. Subsequent investigations by the Landreform Office tends to confirm the opinion of a minority, however, who claim that the *puri* were able to avoid detection of substantial amounts of excess land through a combination of coercion, deception and the trusting compliance of their tenants and clients (MacRae 1997 383-393).

By 1965 the local levels of national administration were increasingly dominated by PKI members, including the local Bupati and Camat (regency and district heads). The local *perbekel* remained loyal to the *puri*. He attempted (so he told me in 1996) to maintain an even-handed relationship with all parties. But when his son, recently

graduated from secondary school, was offered a job at the newly established Bali Beach Hotel, on the condition that he joined PKI, he refused to allow it.

When the killings began, later in 1965, Ubud did not suffer the wholesale slaughter recorded in some other places (Robinson 1996). The former *perbekel* believes that this was, at least in part, the result of his policy of prohibiting the entry of outsiders into the village and maintaining strict control over the behavior of locals. No summary executions were allowed and he insisted that any suspects be dealt with via proper process by the police. When the official lists arrived he had the unenviable duty of calling friends and neighbors, offering them coffee and asking them to report to the police, knowing full well what their fate would be. Other accounts suggest a less orderly process:

I was about four years old at the time. Lots of people came to our house. I was not used to people. I was frightened and hid behind the big water jar in the kitchen. They went to the house north of ours. There was a young man from ... who was very outspoken about politics. He was feeding the pigs when they came. They took him away and beat him in the rice fields. Then they took him to Lebih where he was shot with the others.

According to a man who was employed at the Kantor Camat, and is regarded by some as having been himself a PKI supporter (and who admits to having been pressured to join the party but skillfully avoided either denying or confirming this in conversation with me in 1996), but survived through the protection of friends; there were “hundreds” of PKI supporters in Ubud, effectively most of the land-poor farmers.

There is, however, a version authorized by unwritten public consensus; that the number killed was between ten and fifteen of which only about four or five were PKI members, while a few more may have been genuine sympathizers and supporters. The others killed were either unfortunates caught up in something they did not understand and who found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time or, in a couple of cases, victims of vengeful slander. Recitations of this consensus invariably conclude with the reassuring incantation that even this was an aberration resulting from “outside influences”; for Ubud people are not really interested in politics, only in art and religion.

Paradise Reinstated

Since the 1960s, and especially since the mid 1980s, the center of economic and cultural gravity in Ubud has shifted progressively from

the *puri* and even from the formal political administration, to tourism. It has been the specifically Ubud-brand of cultural tourism oriented, like that of the 1930s, to increasingly affluent Europeans and Americans, and based systematically on the commodification of such aspects of culture as the wet-rice landscape, music, dance, and drama, painting, the Spies golden-age myth, the expatriate-*Puri*-arts axis, and more recently the splendor of temples and the supposed incorporation of the essence of these qualities into tourist facilities such as hotels and restaurants themselves.

The tourism era has been, for those who had lived through the previous half-century, a period of unprecedented prosperity, but more importantly, of freedom from political upheaval and the threat of either starvation or violence. For this generation, as for Ck. Agung, politics is something originating from outside Ubud and it always brings trouble. As one of the few people from whom I could elicit a detailed account of the events of 1965 told me, Ubud people have “had their fingers burnt by politics” (*kapok terhadap politik*).¹⁶

The generations born since around 1960 have grown up in the tourism era and have no direct experience and in most cases little knowledge of the events of 1965. What they have is a rather abstract notion, learnt from school-books, of colonialism and the *merdeka*-struggle. In many cases they also have little or no experience of the agrarian economy. Their priorities in life are defined by an unlikely hybrid of materialist modernity and cultural traditionalism. Politics is (or was prior to 1998), as for their parents, something that happens in Jakarta, or at closest in Denpasar, and is peripheral and, at worst, vaguely threatening to the things they hold dearest¹⁷.

It is small wonder then, that people, especially the older ones, are confused by this new turn of events, which threaten once again, to invert the definitions of right and wrong. Little wonder too that, while the rest of Indonesia began by celebrating its new-found freedom of speech and thought, that they responded by reverting to the safe formula which emerged as the result of decades of suffering. The subsequent descent of “democracy” into regional secession struggles and politically manipulated “inter-religious” violence serves only to confirm, in Balinese thinking, the wisdom of their conservatism.

¹⁶ This phrase translates literally as something like “cured of politics” or “learnt their lesson about politics”. I was not familiar with it at the time, so he illustrated it with the metaphor of a child’s experience with fire or hot water, which suggests the English phrase “getting ones fingers burnt”.

¹⁷ This rather generalized collective portrait is the result of many unsuccessful attempts to cajole young people into discussion of political matters. It is in stark contrast with the attitude of young people in Java and to a lesser extent in Denpasar. The few exceptions in Ubud were people who were, or had been students in Denpasar or further afield.

The Politics of Art

Art in the New Order supposedly represented 'individual freedom of expression' as opposed to ...art dictated by politics (Maklai 1995:70)

Since Acciaioli's (1985) discussion of the absorption of local art forms into depoliticized, sanitized and uniform cultural programs managed by the state, several other scholars have noted similar patterns elsewhere in Indonesia (Bowen 1986, Kipp 1993). Cultural policy has been matched by parallel programs of state intervention in matters of *adat* and *agama*. While the aims of these programs are national ones, "to neutralize the destabilizing potential of ethnic identity and also to use traditional cultures for economic and integrative ends" (Kipp 1993:105), at the local level they tend to be subsumed to the ends of local political players.

In Ubud, local power is strung along an axis between an entrepreneurial sector which has arisen through strategic exploitation of the new opportunities presented by tourism and the *puri*, maneuvering to retain its dwindling but still substantial fund of both symbolic and material capital. Played out against a rapidly changing background defined by the translocal powers of central government and the international tourist industry, this is less a direct struggle than a delicate dynamic balance of opposed and common interests. The commonality of interest between the two poles clusters around a mutual dependence upon tourism, of a specific local brand closely linked to an image of traditional cultural and ritual excellence, local control over outside economic influence, and a minimum of outside political interference. Most of the rest of the community are in one way or another employees, tenants or clients of these two groups, dependent economically and in some cases by ties of material and / or ritual patronage, to either the *puri* or the new entrepreneurial sector. The majority therefore see their own interests less in terms of the inequality between themselves and the wealthy than through the lens of this dependence, as more or less congruent with the interests of *puri* and tourism.

Consequently they tend to see their well-being firstly in predominantly local, rather than regional or national terms and, secondly in terms of a hierarchy of mutual dependence rather than a class system of exploitation. My attempts to discuss what I saw as the exploitative aspects of *puri* dominance were usually circumvented with patient explanations of the self-evident cosmic necessity of hierarchical order and stress upon the mutuality of the relationship. As one person put it: "the *puri* are more afraid of us than we are of them", implying that the bottom line of the interdependency was that the power of the *puri* was ultimately dependent upon the consent of the people. Even the

strongest critics of the *puri* were at pains to point out that their criticism was of the actions of particular *cokorda* rather than of the institution itself, let alone the need for hierarchical order.

Within this constellation of local power relations, art has emerged as an area of common ground, where the inherent conflicts of interest - between foreigners and locals, between the state and the local community, between new entrepreneurs and the old aristocracy, between the emergent classes - are reassuringly blurred. Art, suitably "traditional" in form and content, and sanitized of social, economic and political content, consisting largely of images equating beauty, tradition and order, has served as the perfect language for maintaining a culture of apoliticism. But could it be, as the residual political structures of the New Order crumble, that there are signs of change in the order of Balinese art, and its relationship with politics?

Art and Peace: Closing the Sukawati Century.

Some pages back I asked you to forget for the moment what I described as an emergent political-economic critique of the alliance between government and development interests during the late New Order period. Recent events in Bali provide little opportunity for such practices of forgetting, time-honored though they have become in Ubud culture over the past century. For the first time in the lives of most Balinese, they are being reminded daily by events beyond their control of the inexorably political dimension of their engagement in wider spheres of cultural and economic exchange. There are signs that these reminders are beginning to make themselves felt even in the apolitical world of Balinese art.

In the final weeks of the nineteenth century, Ck. Sukawati was engaged in negotiations with a foreign power which brought to an end a half-century of local political violence in South Bali, ushering in the more subtle violence of the *Pax Neerlandica* and the ensuing separation of culture from politics in Ubud. Precisely one hundred years later, while the descendants of Ck. Sukawati rule over their kingdom of cultural tourism and as the twentieth century drew to its media-mediated close, another Balinese hero was likewise engaged in negotiations to bring together various parties, local and global in the interests of peace. Made Wianta, an artist of trans-Bali reputation, organized a massive public performance event to celebrate World Peace Day on December 10, at Padanggalak beach, about midway between the downstream end of Ck. Sukawati's domain and the place where the Dutch invasion force landed in 1906. His aim was to use the power of art, in the form of a giant white flag drawn by helicopters, to publicize the cause of peace.

This public event was preceded by a two-day seminar at the Arts Center in Denpasar on the theme *Art and Peace*. Although neither

Nelson Mandela nor the Dalai Lama was able to attend as hoped, the speakers included a cosmopolitan array of semi-celebrity status. One made the explicit link (according to BP 9.12.99b) between the policies of the New Order government and the “destruction” of local cultures, the “heart or spirit (*roh*)” of which is none other than art. Another speaker (BP 10.12.99) made the link in more general terms: that “art cannot be separated from political priorities, because art is often used as a tool to achieve (political) ends”. Yet another drew an analogy between the “last” (at least until the next) great royal cremation, of A.A.G. Agung of Puri Gianyar,¹⁸ in which “tens of thousands” of people engaged in a massive public ritual of annihilation by fire, and the riots: “Perhaps the amuk massa is a form of prayer? Can this form of violence [...] transform into peace? [...] it can happen only once [...] and Bali can hope for peace and safety as before (BP 11.12.99)¹⁹”.

References

Acciaioli, G. 1985. ‘Culture as Art: from practice to spectacle in Indonesia’. *Canberra Anthropology*. 8(1&2):148-172.

Anderson, B. 1990. ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’. In *Language and Power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Bali Post Articles:

22.10.99 Bali Lumpuh Total: akibat Amuk Massa.

25.10.98a Soal Bali Rusuh, tak perlu cari kambing hitam. (Warung Global Interaktif)

b Jangan salahkan rakyat.

¹⁸ The speaker was presumably aware that this cremation was heavily subsidized by the sale of the TV rights, but as a non-Balinese he may not have been aware of the widespread belief in Bali that the ritual workers (*pengayah*) for this cremation were paid for their services.

¹⁹ This is not an isolated example of an emerging repoliticization of art. AS Brita Maklai (1995) argues there has been a minor but growing counter-current of political commentary in Indonesian art throughout the New Order period. Not surprisingly this has swelled considerably since 1998. Early in 1999 Rucina Ballinger (pers. com. 30.4.99) reported explicit messages about the national political situation in a performance by the state-sponsored STSI academy. Later in the year, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Cohen 1999a,b) reported on the new political themes being embraced by artists in Jogjakarta, arguably the epicenter of Indonesian painting. Meanwhile, at one of the art museums of Ubud, another famous artist from Sukawati itself, Nyoman Erewan, was staging an installation/performance of ritual-like quality which at least one critic interpreted as an indirect commentary upon the recent political violence ((11.12.99b).

- 2.6.98 Ribuan Turis Batal Kunjungi Kintamani.
- 10.6.98 Inflasi di Bali 34,84 Persen.
- 11.6.98 Sembahyang agar Krisis Berakhir.
- 27.6.98 Besok, Umat Hindu Adakan Upacara “Peneduh Jagat”.
- 2.11.99a Pariwisata Bali. Hikmah di Balik “Musibah”.
 b Lemahnya Kontribusi Agama Dalam Kehidupan Berpolitik.
 (Mimbar Hindu, Drs. I Ketut Wiana).
- 4.11.99a Tujuh Persen Wisman alihkan Tujuan ke Thailand.
 b Kerusakan dan Rasa Termarginalisasi. (Telewisata, Pitana)
 c Ada “Nilai Baru” Rusak Kerukunan di Bali.
- 8.11.99a Muspida - Adat Sepakat Provokator Diusut Tuntas.
 b Kamis Kelabu, Umat Hindu mestinya Malu. (Bias Bali, Wayan Supartha)
- 9.11.99a Gubernur: Itu Trik Negara Pesaing.
 b KUD di Bali Rugi Rp 8 Milyar Lebih.
 c Desa Adat masih ampuh Cegah Gangguan Luar.
 d Idealnya Tim Pencari Fakta Dibentuk Pemerintah.
- 10.11.99a Kemampuan Desa Adat, tergantung para “Manggala”?
 (Warung Global Interaktif - “Bali Post”).
 b Semua Pihak harus Terlibat Amankan Bali. (Fenomena).
 c Keamanan, bukan Tanggung Jawab Desa adat.
 d Mengapa orang Bali selalu Disalahkan?
- 11.11.99 Amuk Massa, Akumulasi Kekecewaan Rakyat Bali (Dari Warung Interaktif - “Bali Post”).
- 13.11.99 Amuk Massa bukan Tanggungjawab Pelaku Pariwisata.
- 15.11.99 Amuk Massa II mungkin Muncul lagi di Bali.
- 19.1.99. Saya Melihat Wajah Kemunafikan Orang Bali.
- 23.11.99a Pasar Australia Diharapkan Normal Tahun Depan.
 b Mengapa Kita Kehilangan Wibawa dan Kepercayaan. (Mimbar Hindu, Drs. I Ketut Wiana)
 c Adat, Kegelisahan Desa dan Cepaknya Negara. (oleh Degung Santikarma).
- 25.11.99 Bali Perlu Desain Investasi untuk Tarik Investor “Non-Tourism”.
- 28.11.99a Amuk Massa, Akumulasi Kekecewaan terhadap Hukum.
 b Semua Pihak perlu Mawas Diri.
- 29.11.99 Mohan Datang Meramal, Umat Hindu Wajib Introspeksi.
- 1.12.99a Mencegah Amuk Massa (oleh Ir. Jero Wacik, S.E.)
 b Cenderung Kedepankan Konflik (Figur)
- 2.12.99a Amuk Massa Bali bukan Lantaran Mega tak Jadi Presiden.
 b Segera Rehab Korban Amuk Massa.
 c Upaya Preventif Kasus Rusuh Masal (oleh Yani Nur Syamsu).
- 3.12.99 Amuk Massa Babak Ke-2, Mungkin Mungkinkah?

- 7.12.99 “Tawur Agung” di Badung.
 9.12.99 Citra Bali yang Damai. (Telewisata, Pitana).
 10.12.99 Seni tak bisa Lepas dari Kepentingan Politik.
 . 11.12.99a Kesenian, Pengikat Nilai-nilai di Masyarakat. (Kultur).
 b Erewan Pentaskan “Kremasi Waktu”.
 13.12.99 Pelaku amuk Massa 21 Oktober segera Diadili.

Bateson, G. and Mead, M.. 1942. *Balinese Character: A photographic analysis*. New York: N.Y. Academy of Sciences.

Bowen, J. 1986. ‘On the Political Construction of *Gotong-Royong* in Indonesia’. *Journal of Asian Studies* XLV(3):545-561.

Cohen, M. 1999a. ‘Artistic Freedom: The art of the possible’. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16.12.99.

Cohen, M. 1999b. ‘Artistic Freedom: Art against the machine’. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16.12.99.

Covarrubias, M. 1994. *Island of Bali*. New York: Knopf.

Darling, J. and Rhodius H. 1980. *Walter Spies and Balinese Art*. Zurphen: Terra.

Djelantik, A.A.M. 1990. *Balinese Paintings*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Second Edition.

DeBoer, F. E. 1996. ‘Two Modern Balinese Theatre Genres’. In A. Vickers (ed.) 1996, *Being Modern in Bali: Image and Change*. Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No 43, pp. 158-178.

Forge, A. 1980. ‘Balinese Religion and Indonesian Identity’. In J. J. Fox et. al. (eds), *Indonesia: Australian Perspectives*, pp. 221-34. Canberra: ANU Press.

Fussell, P. 1980. *Abroad: British Literary Travelling between the Wars*. New York. Oxford University Press.

Geertz, H. 1994. *Images of Power: Balinese paintings made for Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Hilberry, R. 1979. *Reminiscences of a Balinese Prince*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. Southeast Asia Paper, No14.

Hooker, V. M. and Dick H. 1995. ‘Introduction’. In V.M. Hooker (ed.), *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Jakarta Post Article

25.11.99. Travel agents look to calm after the storm. (Travel Agent, by I Wayan Juniarta)

Kam, G. 1993. *Perceptions of Paradise: Images of Bali in the Arts*. Ubud: Yayasan Dharma Seni.

Kertonegoro, M. 1987. *The Guard of Ubud Corner*. Ubud: Harkat Foundation.

Kipp, R. 1993. *Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, religion and class in an Indonesian society*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

MacRae, G.S. 1992. *Tourism and Balinese Culture*. University of Auckland, unpublished. M. Phil. thesis.

MacRae, G.S. 1997. *Economy, Ritual and History in a Balinese Tourist Town*. University of Auckland, unpublished. Ph.D. thesis.

Maklai, B. 1995. 'New Streams, New Visions: Contemporary art since 1966'. In M. Hooker (ed.), *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Pemberton, J. 1994. *On the Subject of "Java"*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Powell, H. 1985. *The Last Paradise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pollman, T. 1990. 'Margaret Mead's Balinese: The fitting symbols of the American Dream'. *Indonesia* 49:1-35.

Robinson, G. 1995. *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political violence in Bali*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Roosevelt, A. 1985. 'Introduction'. In H. Powell, *The Last Paradise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Steedly, M.M. 1993. *Hanging Without a Rope: Narrative experience in postcolonial Karoland*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Santikarma, D. 1999. 'Bali's peaceful reputation suffers a blow ahead of 2000'. *Jakarta Post*, 28.10.99.

Tsing, A. Lowenhaupt- 1993. *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an out-of-the-way place*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stuart-Fox., D. 1992. *Bibliography of Bali: Publications from 1920 to 1990*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Vickers, A.H. 1991. *Bali: A paradise created*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Vickers, A.H. 1996. *Being Modern in Bali: Image and Change*. Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monographs, No 43.

Wiener, M. 1999. 'Making Local History in New Order Bali: Public culture and the politics of the past'. In R. Rubinstein and L. Connor (eds.), *Staying Local in the Global Village: Bali in the twentieth century*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Williamson, J. 1978. *Decoding Advertisements*.