

GLOBAL VILLAGE OR NEO-NEGARA?  
Acting global, thinking local in a Balinese tourist town.

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## GLOBAL VILLAGE OR NEO-NEGARA? Acting global, thinking local in a Balinese tourist town.

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### **The Global Village.**

Ubud: a name, a label given to an entity defined differently by different people for different purposes: tourist destination, paradise of expatriate imagining, administrative village and/or district, ritual village (*desa adat*), kingdom, palace (*puri*). All imply bounded unity of some kind yet the only boundaries easy to find are the administrative ones, on the big clumsily-painted wall-map in the district (*kecamatan*) office. 'Where are you from?' I ask the blonde woman with the American accent. 'From Ubud'. 'I come from Ubud too' says the seller of bamboo lamp shades in the Kuta sunset. 'Whereabouts in Ubud?' 'From Tampaksiring'. 'Where are you going?' I ask my neighbour in Taman, knowing full well she is going to the market five minutes walk away. 'To Ubud'. 'But where are the boundaries of your survey area?' asks the frustrated official trying to process my research permit. "That is a good question" I think to myself<sup>1</sup>.

Anthropologyland (Dirks 1994:483) is full of villages like Ubud with exotic names and markets and communities about whose local specificity we can say this or that. We all know now that the discreteness, autonomy and boundedness of these villages which we once took for granted was something of an illusion and it has even been argued that the notion of the village itself was "...no more than a colonial construction imposed on an extremely fluid, rural society in which patronage was far more important than communal bonds (Schulte-Nordholt 1991:2, referring to Breman 1988 and others)<sup>2</sup>. Anthropology prefers now to concern itself instead with "such regional processes as: state formation and disintegration; transnational or multi-state networks;...supralocal and overseas communities ... or other phenomena of suitably wide regional scale" (Auckland 1994). In practice however the villages have not gone away: people still live in them and think them and in Bali I am now more often surprised by local-ness where I have come to expect global-ness than vice-versa.

The beguiling image of the "global village" was coined in the 1970s (McLuhan 1968) to suggest the potential of new communication technologies to shrink the globe into a village-like community. The 1990s term "globalisation" draws attention to the other side of this process, whereby villages supposedly once isolated are progressively integrated into economic and cultural systems of global scope. Ubud is a "global village" of the latter type, a tourist boom-town in a tourist boom-island where people, ideas and money fresh off aircraft and electronic media from all over the world rub shoulders with each other and with those of the local village community.

Despite being promoted in the global tourism supermarket as the quintessential local product, a traditional village, the development of Ubud has for over a century been inseparable from links with foreign people and places and its contemporary economy is based upon a massive flow of foreign currency through tourism and handicraft exports. It was this economy and its relationship with tradition which I went there to study in 1993<sup>3</sup>. I found however that while the locals were acting (predictably) global, they were thinking (surprisingly) local: although by no means ignorant of the basic world-economic processes upon which their livelihoods depended, they tended to speak of their own prosperity, like all aspects of their lives,

primarily in terms of their relationships with invisible (*niskala*) beings and forces of more or less local nature and not subject to historical change<sup>4</sup>.

My subsequent research came to focus increasingly on these local relationships with the invisible world which led me to a whole other "Ubud" constituted not by processes of exchange with wider economic zones but by spatial relationships between sacred places (MacRae 1995, 1997a). These alternative 'Ubuds' may be characterised by opposition not only along the axis between the global and the local but along a number of polar axes, not unrelated but not perfectly aligned either: modern vs. traditional, changing vs. timeless, economic vs. religious, visible vs. invisible (c/f Wiener 1995:12-13), tourism vs. culture<sup>5</sup>. While such oppositions are deeply embedded in the history/structure of anthropological thought, reflecting ways of looking at the world, they are also empirically evident in Ubud and are used frequently by Balinese when talking about conditions in Bali at present.

Understanding Ubud involves understanding the relationship between such multiplex and seemingly contradictory aspects and this paper summarises part of my attempt to do just this. It proceeds by shifting between levels along all these axes without presuming to over-determine the inherently blurred boundaries between them. We begin with the here and now.

### **The Geography and History of Ritual Practice.**

The people of Ubud have long supported themselves by growing rice and other subsistence crops but this is now supplemented and to a degree replaced by the provision of various goods and services to tourists. Ideologically however, this new mode of material production is dominated, as was the old one, by the need to maintain harmonious relationships with a complex pantheon of invisible (*niskala*) beings and forces. This is achieved by a system of ritual works (*karya*) based upon sacrificial offerings (*banten*) to such beings. This system is structured within an elaborate ordering of time and space into interconnecting rhythms and contours of sacredness or spiritual appropriateness. Hours, days, months, phases of the moon, seasons, directions, elevation, hills and valleys, rivers, lakes and sea are the elements of this system and their combinations are many and varied.

By locating the main nodes at which ritual resources and labour are deployed (spatially in temples, temporally at ceremonies) and tracking various kinds of connections between them (processions, ritual exchanges) it is possible to construct maps representing what might be described as a *niskala* landscape, invisible to normal human vision but underlying the physical, historical and social landscapes<sup>6</sup>. The important units of this landscape are not only named institutions such as villages (*desa*) or even temples themselves, but networks constituted by the links between such institutions. From this point of view the importance of Ubud lies not in its status as a village but as an important if somewhat anomalous node in a network of villages roughly contained within a river valley. In other words, even what appear to be the most local of (ritual) units cannot be properly understood except as part of wider networks.

Figure 1 A procession Plots the Ritual Landscape

Figure 2 Ubud Ritual Networks

My attempts to understand this form of regional organisation in terms of spatial or structural logics foundered on the imperfect congruence between the different 'layers' from which my maps were constructed. The journeys of a founding mytho/historical hero did not quite fit with a pattern of unusually-oriented temple buildings, with the migrations of magical monsters (*barong*), the irrigation system or with the form of the physical landscape itself. The more closely I analysed it the less it looked like a timeless sacred *mandala* and more like a *bricolage*, an ongoing improvisation from the cultural materials at hand sustained by a peculiarly Balinese genius for drawing significant inferences from unlikely parallels.

By (re)turning to an historical approach, focusing on the origins and processes of change of the component links, it became apparent that this was indeed the case: the present form of the network was created, maintained and developed largely through the agency of the hereditary rulers of Ubud, the *puri*<sup>7</sup>. While the component *barong*, villages, temples and stories are 'local' and many of them predate the *puri*, their combination into a more or less coherent ideology has been the work of the *puri* over the past couple of decades. The geographical region involved, roughly the watershed of the Wos River, approximates the extent of the nineteenth-century kingdom of Ubud but the ritual linking of the whole watershed under the spiritual umbrella (*payung*) of Puri Ubud is a relatively recent phenomenon. Not only is the seemingly local actually regional but what appears as a spatial form cannot be understood without reference to the temporal (historical) process by which it is generated and what appears as religious is also political.

The 'Ubuds' which come into focus from attention to 'global/economic' versus 'local/ritual' aspects are neither simple inversions of each other, nor are they the separate worlds they at first appear to be: under careful scrutiny they tend to dissolve into each other or rather into a mass of intermediate levels awkwardly entangled with economic, political and historical processes. The Wos Valley network, and the subject of ritual networks generally, have been discussed in some detail elsewhere (MacRae 1995, 1997a,b). This paper explores the levels between that of ritual networks and of global tourism and the untidy processes which generate and link these levels.

### **Space, Time and Mode: a Methodological Digression.**

Although not made explicitly, one of the implicit arguments of my earlier paper (MacRae 1988b) is for an approach to Balinese cultural order through analysis of spatial relationships. Another is for the need for attention to specific historical process as the key to understanding these patterns in space. I reiterate these more explicitly here in order to suggest firstly that what is really needed is an approach which consciously combines the two and secondly that the problem of space and time is not unrelated to the problem of articulating between the local and the global<sup>8</sup>.

In my project it was only by looking at spatial forms and, more importantly, relationships between places that I was able to transcend the (self-imposed) limitations of trying to track an historical process within the various (ill-defined) spaces known as Ubud. Conversely it was only by shifting to historical analysis that I was able to make sense of the patterns configured in space and relate them back to my initial questions in Ubud<sup>9</sup>.

The relationship between local and global phenomena presents similar problems. My awareness of the network(s) of the upper Wos Valley resulted not only from a shift of focus from historical process to spatial form and (particularly) relationship but also from the (global) context of tourism to the (local) one of ritual and thus back to a more regional level at which the historical processes involved once again could not be ignored.

As I began to understand the role of Puri Ubud in all of this I began to see it as the point of articulation between these levels and perspectives. What the *puri* (and indeed anything else)

looks like depends upon the point of view from which I look at it. From a global point of view its most salient feature is its landholdings and investment in tourism. From a local one its role in ritual and its magico/moral authority predominate. At the levels of Indonesia, Bali and Gianyar, different aspects come into play.

Jean and John Comaroff, in a carefully reasoned discussion of the relationship between history and anthropology (1992:96-7), argue that all societies are (and always have been) "caught up in processes of articulation" with larger social, economic and political environments and that the various levels of these (regional chiefdoms, colonial empires, nation-states, the world economy) give rise to "temporal axes" of shorter and longer duration. Implicit in their argument are two important points: firstly that the duration of processes in time are related (not necessarily directly) to the scale of connections in space. Secondly, these latter are not usefully reducible to the global and the local: there are multiple levels of temporal process corresponding to different levels of spatial connection<sup>10</sup>. The Comaroffs argue for an historical anthropology which takes into account all the elements in this "equation" (1992:98). Although methodologically they emphasise the dualities local/global and short/long run, the application of their equation to a specific context in Southern Africa involves complex interactions of multiple levels of both spatial and temporal units of analysis.

I would suggest that the 'equation' is in fact more complex than the Comaroff's allow: the spatial zones and temporal processes of varying term which become apparent depend, at least in Ubud, upon the activities to which we pay attention, the mode of action at the time. When there is ritual, or when I look at the ritual dimension of things, certain kinds of spatial order become apparent. Conversely when I look at historical process the play of political and economic factors come to light<sup>11</sup>. There are, therefore, three rather than two dimensions across which both empirical variation and our perception of it occurs: spatial (zones), temporal (processes) and modes (of action/perception). To keep track of these, and more importantly the relationships between them, we need to be able to change our "gears" of perception within and between all three.

I began with economic concerns, contemporary and local. To transcend the obvious limitations of these I looked to wider economic links and to ritual. Both of these led to reconceptualisation of Ubud in terms of wider spatial networks. These spatial networks were intelligible in terms of historical processes of varying duration. In the case of the ritual network, the turn to history revealed a political dimension to ritual practice. The sections to follow pick up the story at this point, jump back 100 years and retrace the twentieth-century history of Ubud in terms of the interplay of the factors which become visible at more and less global/local levels of spatial analysis with the historical processes corresponding to these levels.

### **The Life, (Space) and Times of Ubud.**

This all used to be Kerajaan Ubud...the *raja* of Ubud owned all the land from the sea at Ketewel to Taro in the mountains<sup>12</sup>.

## MACRAE - GLOBAL VILLAGE OR NEO-NEGARA?

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### The Village becomes a Kingdom

The former kingdom which Puri Ubud are symbolically reclaiming through their programme of patronage in the Wos Valley was itself the fruit of a programme of expansion by an illustrious ancestor exactly a century previously. Through warfare, diplomacy and the exercise of personal charisma<sup>13</sup>, Cokorda Gede Sukawati (hereafter Ck. Sukawati) steered the development of Ubud from the status of a small and peripheral village to the centre of a vast (by Balinese standards) strip of land from the sea to the lower edge of the mountain plateau<sup>14</sup>.

### Figure 3 Ubud and Neighbours 1900

While expanding from his village base, from around 1880 onward, Ck. Sukawati was

simultaneously developing strategic alliances with the heads (*punggawa*) of neighbouring districts, especially his senior and junior relatives in Peliatan and Tegallalang. These alliances were founded not only on common material interest but ideologically on common descent from the eighteenth-century kingdom of Sukawati, physically long defunct but today still a significant force in the ritual and political geography of the area (Lansing 1983:5-6). While never a guarantee of co-operation, such links through ancestors tend to be a factor towards long-term political cohesion at a local level<sup>15</sup>.

At a broader regional level and during this same period, Ck. Sukawati made himself indispensable to the greater king of Gianyar within whose sphere of jurisdiction his territories fell and to his western neighbour, the king of Mengwi, thus surrounding himself with allies. As his descent relationships with both inclined more toward conflict than co-operation, such alliances were inherently pragmatic arrangements, unstable over time, which he sought to render more enduring by marriage links<sup>16</sup>.

While relatively isolated from wider patterns of regional trade, all the kingdoms of Bali by the mid-nineteenth century, supplemented their local economic bases of agricultural produce and obligatory labour with imports and exports through ports-of-trade managed on their behalf by foreign agents (Agung 1991:4, Hanna 1972:12,55). Gianyar appears to have had one of the less developed of such trade systems which may have been a factor in its declining political fortunes in the latter part of the nineteenth century. After gaining control of the small port of Ketewel in 1891, Ck. Sukawati collected a portion of the duties and harbour fees collected there (Schwartz 1906:177-8). He also gained control, after the fall of Mengwi, of its former uphill dependencies Carangsari and Petang, centres of coffee production and opium exchange, from both of which he gained additional tribute (Schulte-Nordholt 1996:197). In addition to a very substantial subsistence base spread over a wide area of diverse ecosystems and control over most of an irrigation watershed, Ubud had connections with regional export trade sufficient to ensure a substantial cash income attested to by the amount of gold-leaf with which the palace was reputedly encrusted.

The Kingdom becomes part of a colonial empire.

Throughout the period of Ubud's rise to prominence, the Dutch, long established in most of the neighbouring islands and in North Bali, were watching the South and awaiting opportunity there. Their southernmost ally, Bangli, played a prominent part in the aggression which maintained a state of chaos in the region, ultimately destroying Mengwi and bringing Gianyar, by the turn of the century, to the point of collapse.

Ubud thus entered the twentieth century wealthy and powerful but poised uneasily between possible destruction in the local (South Balinese) theatre of warring princes and an uncertain future as part of the huge regional empire of the Netherlands Indies with its links to the world beyond. We have no record of Ck. Sukawati's relationship with the Dutch during this period<sup>17</sup> but subsequent events suggest that he too was watching, waiting and cultivating connections with them. It is known that he played a major part in first persuading the embattled king of Gianyar to offer his kingdom, including Ubud, to the Dutch and then brokering the subsequent negotiations between the parties (Mahaudiana 1968:104, Schulte-Nordholt

1996:200).

Once the deal with the Dutch was concluded, neither his landholdings nor his territorial authority were diminished, in fact his power over them was placed on a more long-term basis, dependent less on the inherent wax and wane of his own charisma than on the supposedly permanent and external power of the colonial state. The establishment several years later, when the whole of South Bali was in Dutch hands, of a bureaucratic system of local administration had the effect of freezing at a certain point a system of constantly shifting alliances of varying size and duration into a rationalised hierarchy of administrative districts of decreasing size but supposedly permanent form (Schulte-Nordholt 1988:205-208).

In addition to having his local economic base and political authority underwritten by the Dutch, Ck.Sukawati received from them a substantial stipend corresponding to the extent of his dominions and perhaps reflecting the general quality of his relationship with them<sup>18</sup>. Local perceptions of his charisma may, if anything have been bolstered rather than diminished by his association with such powerful and dangerous beings as the Dutch<sup>19</sup>. A Dutch visitor to his court in 1902 and 1911 portrays him as man evidently at home in and enjoying the best of both worlds (van Kol 1903:470-474, 1914:346-348). While he attempted to diversify his economic portfolio in accordance with the changing times by investing in the commercial development in Denpasar (Hilbery 1979:10), the beginnings of a new system of land taxation in 1913, a severe earthquake in 1917, the influenza epidemic of 1918 made inroads into this prosperity.

A nineteenth-century local hero and a twentieth-century citizen of the world.

The death of Ck. Sukawati in 1919 marked the end of an extraordinary era during which Ubud moved from a local world of seasonal rhythms and the ebb and flow of kingdoms a few square kilometres in size, becoming for its moment one of such kingdoms, to absorption into a vast colonial empire which brought it ultimately into contact with even wider zones of influence and processes of change. Ck.Sukawati, current fashion in ethnohistory notwithstanding, appears to have been the dominant figure in this process, developing a style of government based upon the globally time-honoured pattern of politico-military alliance followed by politico-economic alliance combined with a locally-defined charisma, rather than upon the ritual display emphasised by C.Geertz (1980, c/f Schulte-Nordholt 1988)<sup>20</sup>. This would come later.

The leadership of the *puri* fell to Ck. Sukawati's eldest son, Ck. Raka (Sukawati), who had been educated in Dutch schools, groomed for the upper echelons of the native civil service and ultimately became closer to the Dutch than his own family let alone the common people of Ubud (Hilbery 1979:7)<sup>21</sup>. His education and contacts enabled him to engineer a subdivision of his father's property favourable to his own interests, while his more global approach to the management of local affairs included such cultural innovations as the import of Walter Spies from Jogjakarta in 1927<sup>22</sup> and a tour of dancers and musicians to Europe in 1931. Ck.Raka's ambitions were ultimately too global for him to be satisfied with the role of local administrator/prince<sup>23</sup> and after the tour he moved into national politics leaving his cousin as the official head of the somewhat reduced administrative district of Ubud and his younger brother in charge of the *puri*.

Exposure to Colonial and World Economies.

The insecurities of the world market were...greater than those of the traditional local market. (Scott 1977:59).

The subdivision of the inheritance left each of the new sub-*puri* with somewhat reduced landholdings and the colonial land taxation system introduced in 1922 rendered even this less profitable than before<sup>24</sup>. The former kingdom was shrinking, dividing and losing its wealth as well as its political dominance. The *puri* however were not the only ones suffering during this period: for the ordinary people the extraordinarily high rates of taxation were a constant burden. The requirement to pay in Dutch currency forced them into greater involvement in the cash economy and the world Depression of 1932 compounded the situation by reducing demand for and prices of export cash crops such as copra, rice, coffee and pigs (Robinson 1995:56-57)<sup>25</sup>.

Contrary to foreign perceptions of Bali during the 1930s, many of which originated in Ubud (e.g. Bateson 1972:116, Covarrubias 1994:15), the Depression years were ones of real hardship clearly remembered today by those old enough. Prominent in these memories is the fear of taxation which is one of a number of reasons cited for the high incidence of landlessness in Ubud: farmers, it is said were afraid to own land because of the tax, preferring to work on land owned by the *puri*, in some cases even giving land to the *puri* to avoid tax<sup>26</sup>.

Population also began to increase during this period (Foley 1987:3.3) and pressure for relatively scarce agricultural land increased. It was during this period of economic stress to which Ubud was exposed through its dependence upon the world economy to pay colonial taxes that the fundamental economic contradiction between the vast landholdings of the *puri* and the hardship experienced by (especially the landless) population began, (as Robinson 1995:57-8 points out for the whole of Bali) to become evident.

The world economy began to enter Ubud in other ways also during this period. Among the litany of economic decline chronicled by Bakker (1937), the only sign of growth over the years 1933-1934 was in the number of tourists visiting the island, from 1795 to 2139 (1937:290). While the majority of these were on 3-day tours of the island, a proportion were longer-term visitors many of them staying with or at least visiting Walter Spies in Ubud. Although not great in number they tended to be reasonably well-heeled and to live in a style requiring the employment of considerable amounts of local labour. Sixty years later there are a few old men who remember working for Spies or his friends and several more who were associated with the Dutch painter Rudolf Bonnet who returned for several years after Independence.

As well as their direct economic impact these expatriate residents developed and marketed to Europe and America Ubud's first and most enduring export product: the image of Bali as a natural, social and aesthetic paradise<sup>27</sup>. While the material fruits of this masterpiece of marketing were not harvested until two generations later, it insinuated into the local cultural economy the distinctly global idea of cultural products as commodities and of culture itself as capital. Once again the *puri* played a leading role in seeing and seizing the opportunity. It was Ck. Raka who, as we have seen, invited Walter Spies to settle in Ubud and who organised the first dance/music tour of Europe<sup>28</sup>. Spies became a patron and mentor of local artists while the

tour introduced the idea of local performing arts as export products on the world market.

After Ck.Raka moved to Jakarta in 1931, his younger brother Ck.Agung took over leadership of the *puri* and of the cultural development of Ubud. He continued to cultivate cultural relationships with foreign expatriates for whom this was something of a golden age, but his own account of the period (Hilbery 1979:15-21) confirms a sense of troubles within the *puri* as much as among the ordinary people. The contradiction between the Dutch colonial vision of global/local relations and that of the expatriate glitterati eventually became too great to sustain and the latter were forced to leave (Vickers 1989:124-125).

Politics, global, colonial and local, 1940-1960.

In 1941 the great European power of the Dutch was replaced with the temporarily greater Asian one of the Japanese. They stripped the resources of the island to support their war throughout the Asia-Pacific region and people in Ubud remember their lives as being reduced to bare survival (Robinson 1995:75-81), Hilbery 1979:23-26). After the war the Dutch returned, were ultimately ousted again by the Indonesian nationalist movement, and the theatre of political struggle shifted from a global to a regional scale.

While from a regional point of view the displacement of an European power by an Asian one had significant implications for the nationalist movement (Vickers 1989:155), from a local (Ubud) point of view however, both were equally non-local and relationships with them tended to be mediated by the *puri*. During the Dutch period it was *puri* members whom they appointed as their local representatives and it was to the *puri* that people took their problems. A number of Ubud people participated actively in the war of independence and in the overlapping/subsequent struggle to define the way in which the newly won power was to be configured in the region.

Gianyar became the centre of a movement for a new, Dutch-sponsored state of Eastern Indonesia. Ck.Raka, through his marriage relationship with Puri Gianyar, supported this movement while the majority of Puri Ubud supported the nationalist/Republican cause. Puri Ubud became a centre of resistance to the Dutch-backed power of Puri Gianyar and the people of the district divided along lines of affiliation to their respective aristocratic patrons, which coincided roughly with the administrative subdistricts of the time. Nationalist/Republicans from throughout the district, including members of Puri Ubud and Peliatan were imprisoned, tortured and killed by the Dutch/Gianyar coalition (Hilbery 1979:32-33). While this could be seen at one level (spatially large but temporally short) as a struggle of Indonesian nationalism against Dutch colonialism, it manifested and was largely seen locally as one spatially limited but going back generations between *puri* supported by their followers recruited on the basis of a combination of hereditary ties and active patronage<sup>29</sup>.

The Ubud/Gianyar conflict was ultimately resolved with the establishment of a new state of Indonesia which from a local point of view simply replaced the previous Japanese and Dutch regimes, but economic and political instability continued through the 1950s (Bagus 1991, Robinson 1988, Hilbery 1979:2, Vickers 1989:146-173). One of the consequences of this series of political upheavals was the exposure of local communities throughout Indonesia to a range of exotic political ideas and practices, and the formation of pan-Indonesian political

movements, one of which, communism, was to play a significant part in the following decade.

Ck.Agung, never a creature of politics like his brother, was increasingly alienated by these problems and withdrew even further: 'From that time there were so many political parties here in Indonesia that I was not interested any longer' (Hilbery 1979:41). He was more inclined to see problems in terms of their supernatural (*niskala*) causes (1979:21) and he devoted his energies accordingly to such projects as the restoration of temples and *barong*<sup>30</sup>. He sought also to supplement his income by opening his *puri* to paying guests, creating in effect the first hotel in Ubud (1979:40).

Local memories of the 1950s emphasise the priority of survival under the constant threat of unpredictable political violence. In the early 1960s economic conditions worsened with rodent plagues, the eruption of Gunung Agung, subsequent crop failures and spectacular rates of inflation, especially of the prices of basic commodities such as rice<sup>31</sup>. Ubud people over about 35 years of age remember clearly as children having insufficient clothing and food, more sweet potato than rice and often just the fibrous trunk of banana trees. According to local opinion Ubud was particularly hard hit and many young men and boys took to the roads during this period picking up work and food wherever they could find it (see also Robinson 1995:241).

During these times of economic change and hardship the lot of the common people was obviously not easy yet the *puri* seems to have maintained a position of considerable economic privilege. Unlike other *puri* which turned to business (C.Geertz 1963:ch.4), government, academic or professional positions, the main economic base of Puri Ubud remained their substantial estates of land which although subdivided had remained virtually intact since the 1890s<sup>32</sup>. The unequal distribution of land and rural relations of production were however obviously factors in the economic suffering of the majority and were becoming a political issue at a national level (Robinson 1995:251-258). The parties of the left, especially the communist party (PKI), with whom President Sukarno had considerable sympathy, pushed for a comprehensive land reform program which began in 1960.

The 1960s: local effects of national economics and politics.

Although landreform proceeded slowly and partially, with large landowners all over Bali displaying considerable resourcefulness to retain as much of possible of their estates, it did have the effect of further subdividing the holdings of the *puri* as well as significantly reducing the total areas held<sup>33</sup>. This forced *puri* members to further diversify their economic endeavours shifting the emphasis from extraction of surplus from the local agricultural economy to investment and partnerships in wider economic zones. While the newly redistributed lands gave small farmers control over the produce of their lands spiralling inflation negated much of their gains. The gradual reduction of the sphere of Puri Ubud's economic domain was accompanied by progressive reductions of the administrative district of Ubud and reduction of the formal role of the *puri* in this administration<sup>34</sup>.

The early 1960s mark the point at which the former kingdom of Ubud was reduced politically to the centre of an unimportant administrative subdistrict and economically to a poor agricultural village. The relationship between the *puri* and its former kingdom was all but broken by economic hardship and political unrest. These strained the internal unity of the local

community also, with two new *banjar* forming along lines of sympathy/opposition to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In both cases the new *banjar* were formed around splinter groups who, if not overtly communist themselves, objected to the anti-PKI of position of the *puri*. In contrast to other *puri*, however they did not during this period withdraw from their relationship of mutual obligation to the local community: indeed it was during this period that Ck.Agung Sukawati began to involve himself in the restoration of temples and organising of ceremonies in Ubud but all over Bali (Hilbery 1979:54-77).

Ubud was less affected than many places by the wave of "anti-communist" violence which swept the country in the months following the attempted coup in Jakarta in September 1965 and the subsequent downfall of President Sukarno. Although there were active PKI cells in nearby villages, most people in Ubud followed the clear PNI affiliation of the *puri*. While there were obviously shades of sympathy toward PKI principles there appear to have been only a handful of active PKI members in Ubud. Estimates of the number of people killed range from nine to around twenty of whom the majority appear to have been innocent hangers-on or victims of vengeful slander. Whether members of the *puri* took the opportunity to get rid of opponents, whether they actually played a part in minimising the killings or whether they lay low in the *puri* until it was over remains a matter of conjecture<sup>35</sup>.

Despite the economic woes of Indonesia, the 1960s were a period of economic growth throughout the developed world, one of the manifestations of which was the spread of mass tourism into the Third World. Sukarno had recognised this and before he was ousted, had taken the first steps to integrate Indonesia into this new vehicle of redistribution of global surplus. Bali was chosen, largely as a result of the image developed in Ubud and exported all over the world during the 1930s, as the central locale for this development. Although Ubud had been the original source of the image, the zone selected in which to concentrate tourist facilities was the coastal area south of Denpasar (MacRae 1992:ch.2, Picard 1990:5).

Tourism: the world comes to the village.

Although geographically peripheral, people from Ubud did participate in this development, which was funded largely by the World Bank and foreign investment (Picard 1990:5-6). Considerable numbers of people migrated to the coast to work on building projects, some of them staying on as employees in hotels. Traders of *batik sarong*, carvings and paintings took their wares to the tourists in the coastal resorts or to Padangbai where the cruise ships berthed<sup>36</sup>.

A minority of tourists however came direct to Ubud and locals responded by providing accommodation and food and showing them the various cultural resources of the area. This practice developed rapidly into hotels, restaurants and shops and by the mid-1980s the economy of Ubud was dominated by a massive inflow of foreign currency and imported products providing for tourist needs and for the burgeoning consumer tastes of the new local middle class. While the Dutch monopolised the transport and accommodation sectors of pre-WW2 tourism and most visitors to Ubud were associated in one way or another with Walter Spies, after the war the *puri* opened the first local hotels and established links with travel agencies in Australia. The new tourism however was different.

Unprecedented economic and cultural conditions in Australia, North America and Europe as well as the development of cheap mass air travel resulted in a mass migration of young people travelling often for months on end in search of various combinations of escape and education, pleasure and profit. It was the response of a wide range of local people to these visitors, rather than the projections of government, world bank or tourist industry planners which conditioned the unique form of tourism in Ubud<sup>37</sup>.

Redefining local culture.

While the *puri* lost their monopoly on tourism, they continued to develop tourism interests, mostly toward the upper end of the market and financed by both sales of land and joint ventures with foreign capital<sup>38</sup>. They also occupied positions at all levels of local government but while these strategies gave them a degree of prosperity and influence they did not become dominant in either field. What they also did, in striking contrast to the other *puri* in Bali<sup>39</sup> was to re-establish their role as guides and guardians of local tradition and ritual. Throughout his career Ck.Agung Sukawati had involved himself in the restoration of temples and their sacred relics (*pretima*) as well as the patronage of the arts (Hilbery 1979). Upon his death this mantle was taken up by his nephew, Ck.Agung Suyasa who has for some years been the elected head (*bendesa adat*) of the traditional (as distinct from administrative) village (*desa adat*).

A booklet (*Monografi*) prepared for the 1983 Lomba Desa<sup>40</sup> provides some insights into Ubud's (official) view of itself at this time. It was prepared by a "team" representing the local community but consisting almost entirely of aristocracy and dominated by the *puri*. Apart from the (inevitable and interminable) lists of organisations, office holders and local statistics which reflect more the criteria of civic excellence upon which the competition was based than actual local priorities, the book records a version of Ubud history which explicitly links local topography, the pan-Balinese origin-myth of Rsi Markandeya, the development of Hinduism in Bali, the descent of Puri Ubud from the original aristocratic settlers from the Majapahit empire in Java, with a succession of administrations and office holders down to the present *puri* (Ubud 1983). The essence of Ubud is thus defined not only in terms of its local characteristics but its place in larger Balinese, Indonesian and Hindu frames of reference. The links between these frames are articulated by the *puri*.

Puri members speak readily of their role in terms of a sacred duty to maintain tradition (*adat/agama*) and to provide leadership and guidance to the wider community. Members of this wider community generally concur (at least publicly, to varying degrees and with a few notable exceptions) with this perception of the ideal role of the *puri*. Outside of Ubud, where such formal avenues, linking customary (*adat*) and administrative (*dinas*) spheres, were not open to them, especially in areas such as Bukit Gunung Lebah which are part of other administrative districts, this role had to be recreated by a program of active patronage.

Cultural patronage: re-creating a regional network.

Throughout the upper Wos Valley a large proportion of villages are linked to the *puri* by

ties of ritual patronage. Materially this takes the form of sponsorship of the artifacts and practices of traditional culture and religion: renovation of temples and sacred objects, especially *barong*, dance/music ensembles and ever bigger and better ceremonies. In exchange the client villages invite the *puri* to their ceremonies as well as attending and providing labour for the ceremonial occasions in Ubud and at the *puri* itself. While this relationship involves an ongoing reciprocity of material resources: essentially money for labour, it also involves a less obvious immaterial exchange.

All the projects of which this patronage is built involve the deployment of intellectual as well as material resources: knowledge, decisions and organisation as well as money. The villages linked to the *puri* in this way ask for and defer to the advice of the *puri* on such matters which often extend to interpretation of local tradition and history. A recurring reply to my questions in these villages was: 'We don't know anything here, if you want to know ask that *cokorda* in Ubud'. While the terms of the material patronage obligate the villages to provide labour to *puri* projects, the terms of the intellectual patronage mean that the control of local knowledge is gradually being centralised in Ubud. When villages ask for help with a temple or *barong* this is rarely (if ever) refused but comes in a package including interpretation of local mytho-history which usually emphasises their integration into the network of which Puri Ubud is the focus (Supartha 1994, 1996). The Wos Valley is replete with examples of local traditions appropriated to the grand narrative told by the *puri*. One which perhaps illustrates most eloquently the extent to which tradition is being re-written to conform to this narrative, is a negative one, of appropriation by exclusion, from a village outside the main network.

Among the distinctive features of the Wos Valley network is a pattern of reversal of the normal orientation of *bale agung*<sup>41</sup>. There are however a few doubly anomalous *bale* outside the valley which are also oriented in this way. In mid-1994 I asked Ck.A. of Puri Ubud about them and, although he had an explanation for the reversal within the valley, he seemed to share my mystification and that of the locals, by these exceptions outside the valley.

In one of these villages the temple in which the *bale agung* was located was, at this time, in the process of being renovated with funds donated by the *puri*. Two years later when I next visited this village, the *bale* had been rebuilt - with its orientation turned to the conventional! The local ritual leader (*bendesa adat*), a young man I knew from his frequent presence in Ubud assisting with ritual matters at the *puri* was there again and I asked him about it. The previous (reversed) orientation, he said, had been wrong - it was appropriate only in the Wos Valley. This had been explained to him by Ck.A. who had offered to "help" them rebuild it the right way round.

Figure 4 Puri Ubud Patronage Network 1996

Figure 5 The Rebuilt Bale Agung

***Negara Ubud.***

We are back where we started but with a better-informed understanding of what is going on. Puri Ubud (or at least some of its more prominent members) are engaged in a programme of what might be described as cultural (re)colonisation. The kingdom which their grandfather built by military conquest and diplomacy a century ago has been whittled away by the successive incursion of historical processes of wider geographical compass. Most of the *puri* of Bali

responded to this process by simply shifting their focus from traditional forms of local leadership to activities such as trade or government, more in keeping with the times. Puri Ubud on the other hand have sought to manage the articulation of Ubud with these processes by entering more tentatively into wider arenas of trade and politics while simultaneously retaining their local authority through ideological dominance backed by material patronage.

Until recently this has been little more than a holding operation, a losing battle against inevitable commercialisation of the economy, secularisation of belief and centralisation of political power all of which have increased the prestige and authority of other parties *vis-a-vis* the *puri*. Since the 1980s however, while these very processes have intensified, the *puri* has been able to turn the local consequences to their own advantage by a skilful blending of material and ideological strategies. While by no means dominant in the local tourism economy, they have developed a strong economic base in tourism-related businesses much of which has been financed by sale, lease or joint-ventures using the remainder of their hereditary landholdings. Instead of reinvesting the proceeds of these enterprises in a conventionally capitalist manner they have used a significant portion to radically upgrade the level of their cultural/religious sponsorship<sup>42</sup>.

The traditional form of this patronage has had the effect of re-establishing the sentiments (if not the forms) of traditional patron-client relations. While they receive no direct economic return from their clients the *puri* receive deference, respect and loyalty to a concept of hereditary lordship. Their moral authority is imbued with a supernatural (*niskala*) dimension associated with the local deities with whom they become identified in the process of rebuilding their temples or sponsoring their ceremonies. By (re)creating this moral authority in a large number of places and explicitly linking them via *niskala* connections to each other and to themselves as the central node, the *puri* are (re)creating a kingdom, more or less coterminous with their old one. This kingdom is constituted not in military, political or economic terms, it is a *negara* (state) of hearts and minds supported on the one hand by material patronage and on the other by (re)activation of traditional beliefs in divine legitimacy.

#### Figure 6 The Puri Leads the Way

My use here of the term *negara* refers obviously to C.Geertz's (1980) celebrated and idiosyncratic use of it to characterise his idealised model of "the nineteenth century Balinese state" constituted by ritual dramaturgy rather than more orthodox technologies of power<sup>43</sup>. A number of writers have expressed reservations about this formulation (Schulte-Nordholt 1981, 1996:6-7, Tambiah 1985, Wiener 1995:10) but the history of Ubud in the late nineteenth century offers a particularly succinct empirical critique in the form of a kingdom whose rise from nowhere was clearly based upon a combination of military and political skills of the most mundanely material kind<sup>44</sup>. In a nicely ironic twist however, as the twentieth century has progressed Ubud has come increasingly to resemble Geertz's vision of the nineteenth, of polities constituted in cultural rather than material terms.

There are however important differences. While the visible manifestations of Puri Ubud's project are cultural/ritual/performative in the sense Geertz describes, it is clearly based upon a process of patronage, fuelled by the transfer of substantial amounts of material resources to the client villages. These resources are paid for by the proceeds from business enterprises,

especially tourism ones and land transactions.

### **Accounting for the Symbolic.**

it is easy to see why the great families never miss a chance (and this is one reason for their predilection for distant marriages and vast processions) to organise exhibitions of symbolic capital (in which conspicuous consumption is only the most visible aspect) (Bourdieu 1994:175)

No material accountancy can discern the rationale of this extravaganza of patronage: the direct economic returns to the *puri* are negligible in relation to the expenditure involved and a magico-moral authority over a few dozen farming villages does not amount to very much in either the globalised economy of tourism or the political arena of modern Indonesia. On the other hand it is stretching credulity somewhat to accept at face value (as many of their village clients appear to do) the official *puri* version of this programme as simply a cultural imperative: the exercise of their hereditary and sacred responsibility to provide the spiritual and moral guidance, leadership and welfare which their people need and expect of them.

To make sense of it requires that we expand our notion of purposive action to take into account the symbolic as well as material dimensions of such purpose. What Puri Ubud are doing is sacrificing material resources within a cultural context in which they receive in exchange the non-material goods of supernatural merit and socio-cultural prestige. There is nothing particularly mysterious or unusual about this: it is the universal form of patronage, "...a kind of 'politics of reputation' in which a good name is conferred in exchange for adherence to a certain form of conduct" (Scott 1985:185). There are however, here and I suspect elsewhere, more than reputations at stake and the exchange is as much economic as political. The "form of conduct" involved consists of substantial economic outlay and the supernatural merit acquired in addition to the good name, creates the appearance of a conventional ritual exchange with the gods.

This patronage is clearly an act of exchange and as Mauss (1990:3) insists of exchange (and Balinese economic theory agrees) it must, if the relationship involved is to be sustainable, be (or at least appear to be) reciprocal. That is the giver must receive something in return and the receiver must give. From a local point of view this requirement is satisfied at a material level by the respect and obedience of the client villages and at a *niskala* one by the beneficence of the deities involved. I would argue however that the respect and obedience of a few villages is in itself inadequate return for the outlay involved and that the *niskala* rewards may (with due respect to both the people and the deities involved) obscure/reflect a further level of material reciprocity.

Pierre Bourdieu (1994:173), writing of a similarly obscured interface between gift and monetary exchanges in North Africa, and drawing upon both Mauss and Marx, refers to non-material assets of this kind as "symbolic capital" and argues for an all-inclusive "economics of practice" in which material and symbolic capital are "undifferentiated" and "perfect(ly) inconvertible". While there are problems with Bourdieu's formulation (Smart 1993), it offers a useful metaphor with which to begin thinking about the *negara* of patronage in the Wos Valley:

it may be seen as a kind of capital asset of Puri Ubud, constituted by the conversion of material (monetary) capital into the symbolic capital of socio/political prestige and *niskala* merit. For such an economics of practice to work however it is essential that the symbolic capital thus created/converted be reconvertible back into material capital as required by its owners/controllers<sup>45</sup>.

The symbolic capital (if we pursue this metaphor) embodied/stored in the neo-*negara* of the Wos Valley network is re-converted and reinvested in a number of ways, the most graphically expressive of which is in the symbiotic relationship between tourism and "traditional culture". While it is the material capital accumulated through tourism that is being converted into the cultural forms of the *negara*, it is precisely the reputation for conservation and development of traditional cultural forms which is the resource, the symbolic capital upon which tourism in Ubud was founded and is maintained and developed (Vickers 1989:140-2).

It is thus the returns, through tourism, from the investment of symbolic capital which create the ongoing material profits which in turn enable further re-investment in symbolic as well as material capital<sup>46</sup>. The ideological force of this material symbiosis is reinforced in local belief by its symmetry with a *niskala* symbiosis expressed in terms such as: "All this prosperity has been given to us by the gods: therefore the least we can do is to offer back to them as much as possible by looking after their temples and making the best offerings and ceremonies we can afford" and "The gods have been generous to us because of the diligence with which we make offerings to them and adhere to our traditions." This understanding of the material and symbolic foundations of current prosperity and of the pivotal role of the *puri* in maintaining it serves to legitimate their privileged status and to defuse most criticism and virtually all resistance to their position and activities<sup>47</sup>.

The returns from this program of investment in the symbolic have been limited neither to the Wos Valley nor the economic sphere. Symbolic capital is a form of accumulation or credit whose currency is, like that of monetary capital, inherently trans-local. Puri Ubud, although by descent not the senior branch of the Sukawati lineage<sup>48</sup> have assumed a kind of *de facto* precedence within the clan most visibly evident in their renovation of the Sukawati family sub-temple at Besakih<sup>49</sup> in the Ubud style recognisable for its liberal use of carving, red paint and gold leaf. This precedence enables them to (re)claim a kind of symbolic authority over the area once "owned" by Sukawati, between the rivers Ayung and Pakerisan from the sea to Mount Batur. The main temple of this mountain, Pura Batur<sup>50</sup> and Pura Er Jeruk, a temple associated with the origins of Sukawati are two sites in which Puri Ubud has recently chosen to make substantial material investments.

Since the disintegration of Sukawati in the mid-eighteenth century, both political control and symbolic precedence in this area have been contested between its descendants and the rulers of the emergent kingdom of Gianyar. The combination of economic and cultural prominence of Puri Ubud are now such that they cannot be ignored at a formal political level and while the leadership of the district of Gianyar remained, until the early independence period, in the hands of Puri Gianyar and has since then nominally rotated among the various sub-districts, the heads (*bupati*) since 1983 have been from Puri Ubud.

This shift of the centre of gravity of symbolic authority and the effectiveness of the conversion of material into symbolic capital were recently tested on the occasion of a major ceremony at Pura Samuan Tiga, an important temple pre-dating either *puri* (Gianyar or Ubud)

and situated at Bedulu, a village of independently ancient tradition but historically the site of conflicts between Gianyar and Ubud/Sukawati. Both *puri* contributed to the ceremony in an attempt to associate themselves symbolically with the *niskala* power of the temple. When I arrived at the climax (*puncak*) of the ceremony important offerings in the form of sacred dances were being performed by a *cokorda* from Ubud. An informant asked: "So do you know now which *puri* won the battle?"<sup>51</sup>

In a larger arena again, Puri Ubud have become well-known for their role, in partnership with both the symbolic capital of Pura Batur and Parisada Hindu Dharma and the material capital of a prominent Balinese businessman, in the conception, development and maintenance of a Bali-Hindu temple at Mt.Semeru in East Java. This place is associated both with the origins of Balinese cultural/religious tradition and with the Indian origins of pan-Indonesian Hinduism. By successfully identifying their name with it, Puri Ubud have achieved a symbolic capital asset of the highest order and widest currency. The means by which they have achieved this have been largely through direct investment of (reputedly large amounts of) material capital and through reconversion of symbolic capital around Ubud into the form of busloads of ritual labour and truckloads of offerings to each major ceremony at Pura Semeru<sup>52</sup>.

In the mountain area around Semeru, where most of the local population practice a form of Hinduism which they (and Balinese) believe to be a somewhat attenuated branch from the same (Majapahit) root as Balinese religion, Ck.A. has begun another local programme of sponsorship of temples. Because of the relative poverty of the area and a degree of religious demoralisation in the face of growing Islamic dominance, this has provided an enormous boost to local Hindu communities who seem only too willing to embrace Bali/Ubud versions of temple form and ritual practice and interpretations of their own history. More recently the cultural influence of Puri Ubud has expanded further to East Kalimantan, with the planning of another temple at Kutai, the site of the (allegedly) first Hindu settlement in Indonesia<sup>53</sup>.

### **Concluding Movement.**

A quality of Balinese dance which sets it off from the more Indianised forms of much of Southeast Asia is a dynamic asymmetry derived from constant shifting of the centre of gravity of the dancer from one foot to the other and from higher to lower<sup>54</sup>. In less elegant but somewhat analogous manner we have tangoed between spatial zones, temporal processes and modes of thought/action, creating a cotillion of connections which I trust tell their own story. Between the steps I have endeavoured to advance an argument which makes more general points at several levels.

Firstly, most locally and most ethnographically: that what the various parties concerned refer to as Ubud is an entity perceived in various forms according to the point of view of the parties involved. An holistic understanding needs to recognise not only all of these but their constitution through processes of local, colonial, national and global scope and ritual, economic and political mode. Ubud is thus both a series of dissonant unitary conceptions and a polyphony of pattern and process which deconstructs these unitary conceptions while simultaneously linking them.

Secondly, that the implications for the "village studies debate" are that the polarised

terms in which it is presented (e.g. by Breman 1988, Kemp 1988) may be over-conceived. While Ubud is an exceptionally complex and globalised village, in which this point is inescapable, all villages are to a degree artifacts constituted at the intersection of similarly multiplex processes. They are also however, not merely the machinations of colonial, academic and touristic imaginations but empirical realities, physical, social, economic, ritual and administrative for the people variously involved in them. The village is dead: long live the village.

Thirdly, that Balinese studies have historically been skewed toward the ritual, performative and aesthetic aspects of Balinese culture with a minority addressing economic and political matters. In very few cases have attempts been made, let alone successfully (Lansing 1991, Warren 1993 being notable exceptions) to consider them in relationship. By using the metaphor of symbolic capital I have attempted to show here the deep and systematic interpenetration of the domains we label the material and the symbolic and the need to consider them as aspects of socio/economic form/process rather than independently.

Fourthly, the same point need not be reiterated for anthropological method in general where it is more generally recognised. It remains however in disguised form in the problematic relationship between history and anthropology. This too has tended to polarise into approaches which would reduce historical process to transformation of timeless cultural structures (e.g. Biersack et al 1991) and others in which cultural forms are the momentary reflections of underlying economic processes.

The material presented here suggests that it is a consequence of attention to spatial and temporal patterning to render more visible different modes of social practice and conversely that attention to different modes of social practice (such as those conventionally designated ritual and economics) draws attention differentially to spatial pattern and temporal process. Consequently a properly anthropological history or historical anthropology will, as the Comaroffs argue, take into account multiple levels of spatial zone and temporal process and furthermore, the modes of practice through which they are related.

#### NOTES

1. Tampaksiring is only some 10 km. from Ubud but is a village, court centre and administrative sub-district in itself. Taman is one of the constituent neighbourhoods (*banjar*) of Ubud only a few minutes walk from the centre. The Indonesian state, despite much rhetorical emphasis on national unity, is administered through an hierarchy of clearly bounded spatial units.

2. I refer here to debates over the status of "the village" or "the (closed corporate) community" both as empirical entity and analytic concept which have been conducted at the level of Bali studies (Guermonprez 1990, Warren 1993:3-5), Southeast Asian studies (Breman 1988, Kemp 1988), and peasant studies (Greenberg 1995, Wolf 1957). The debate concerns a set of assumptions about the discrete, autonomous, bounded nature of

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the village which provide the theoretical foundation for the research practice of "village studies" as a central tool of anthropology, rural sociology, and to a lesser extent other disciplines. For a particularly concise summary see Ruitter & Schulte-Nordholt (1989).

3. Field research was carried out in 1993/4 and 1996. I am grateful to Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia for organising the necessary permits, to Dr.N.Erewan of Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Udayana for his sponsorship, to the University of Auckland for funding assistance, to Max Rimoldi, Steve Webster and the editors of this volume for their comments on previous drafts and Balinese too numerous to list here for their hospitality and patient instruction.

4. At least they said this is how they understood it and their actions. Putting their money where their mouth was, in the form of ritual labour and expenditure, adds weight to this impression. For general discussions of the importance of the *niskala* domain in Balinese life see Warren (1993:40) and Wiener (1995:49-50).

5. The existence of these alternative Ubuds recalls Hauser-Schaublin's notion of the two 'worlds' of tourism and 'Balinese' life in Sanur (1995:8) as well as more generalised anthropological oppositions between communities integrated spatially and temporally into wider spheres of exchange and historical processes and those supposedly isolated from them.

The assumption of spatial isolation and historical stasis was deeply embedded in the reaction of functionalist theory to the twin evils of diffusionism and evolutionism and the fieldwork practice to which it was wedded provided ethnographic data structured in such a way as to reinforce rather than challenge such assumptions. The equally radical ahistoricism of the most influential anthropologist of the 1960s, Levi-Strauss served to keep this illusion alive long after the likes of Evans-Pritchard (1950:18) had argued and Leach (1954) had (if unwittingly) demonstrated that it was not so.

These 'alternative Ubuds' are of course only two among the many ways in which Ubud is variously constituted by groups including the tourist industry, expatriate community, national administration, immigrant labourers and Balinese from other areas.

6. The Balinese calender is in effect an equivalent 'map' of *niskala* time (see Eisemann 1990:73, Goris 1984, Lansing 1983:53-55, 1991:67-70 for expositions of this calender).

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7. *Puri* means 'palace' (or 'court') in the English sense of house, family and political institution. For the etymology of the Balinese term see Wiener (1995:394) and for discussions of aspects of its social, spatial and symbolic construction see Geertz (1980), Lansing (1983:37-41), Schulte-Nordholt (1991) and Vickers (1989:48). While I refer to Puri Ubud here as if it were a monolithic institution it is, like the palaces of Western history (not to mention the tabloid press) a complex of individuals, families, alliances and factions characterised as much by the private divisions between them as its public unity.

8. I refer here to space and time with the awareness that, as the Comaroffs (1992:95) remind us "...history, time and process are not the same thing..." any more than geography, space and landscape are. As Fabian (1983) argues, under-reflected assumptions about time and space are deeply embedded in anthropological practice and I think this applies as much in Bali as anywhere else. This is not however the place to pursue my reflections on the subject(s) beyond reiterating the point upon which my argument here rests: that different aspects come into focus through attention to spatial form and to temporal process. This point is implicit also in recent attempts to consciously spatialise historical process (Carter 1987) and historicise spatial arrangements (Davis 1992).

9. Valeri (1991:147) says much the same of the relationship between structure and process; that they "illuminate" and are "condition(s) of intelligibility" of each other. While my concern is here with the relationship between spatial organisation and temporal process, I would argue (c/f Fabian 1983) that the whole notion of "structure" is conceived in terms of an essentially spatial metaphor and is thus a specific case of the broader argument I am making here.

10. Similar points have been made before by Roseberry (1994:152) and in several of the essays in Biersack's (1991) collection. Insufficiently reflective anthropologists are not however the only ones who fail to adequately analyse the complexity of the relationships involved.

Linneken (1991) argues that indigenous Hawaiaan theory on the matter reproduces the local/global dichotomy expressed as inside/outside and referring to the oppositions of local/foreign, rural/urban. Balinese equation of *jero/jaba* (inside/outside) and *bali/jawa* (Bali/beyond Bali), as well as frequent public statements throughout Indonesia opposing local to "foreign" products, practices or ideas involve a similar reductionism. The discourse of recent political responses in

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New Zealand and Australia to Southeast Asian immigration suggest a widespread currency of conceptual reduction of processes involving changes of social space.

11. I emphasise here that by ritual (or economics or politics) I mean both a mode of Balinese action and an analytic category by which I order my observations of Balinese activities.

12. This was a typical response to my questions throughout the Wos valley as to the nature of local relationships with Puri Ubud. This section summarises a more comprehensive history of Ubud which forms part of my (1997) dissertation. It is based upon a synthesis of local oral accounts, manuscripts and published sources in Balinese, Dutch and Indonesian which are fully referenced in the dissertation. *Kerajaan* means kingdom. *Raja* means king.

13. 'Charisma' is used here as a gloss for a peculiarly Malay constellation of personal qualities and attributes of leadership of which invisible/spiritual power (*kesaktian*) is believed to be the foundation. In the case of Ubud, the *kesaktian* of the *puri* was and indeed still is associated with the possession of certain heirloom regalia (*pusaka*) the earliest of which Ck. Gede Sukawati inherited from his father, also a leader of some *kesaktian*. The only western account of Ck. Sukawati, by H.H. van Kol (1903:470), who was probably ignorant of Balinese notions of *kesaktian*, stresses a personal quality best summarised as 'charisma'. For a thorough discussion of *kesaktian* see Anderson (1972) and of the role of *pusaka*, Errington (1983).

14. The configuration of this land, most of it within a single watershed, and the history of its acquisition conform nicely to C. Geertz's (1980:19-24) insightful model of the role of topographic and hydrological factors in shaping the political geography of South Bali.

15. Indeed it was through the defeat of Puri Negara, also a closely related descendent of Puri Sukawati and a former ally, that Puri Ubud acquired the largest component of its material wealth and confirmation of its *kesaktian*. An underlying theme of accounts of this episode however is the regret of all concerned at being involved in such a fratricidal conflict and emphasis upon the divisive role of external (i.e. non-Sukawati descended) elements.

16. Descent ties seemed in general to become less binding at larger regional levels and indeed Ck.Sukawati's deepest enmity was with his relatives (through pre-Sukawati descent) in Puri

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Klungkung.

17. I have not yet had the opportunity to systematically search the Dutch archives for such evidence but there is none in the limited Dutch sources to which I have had access nor is any reported by researchers more familiar with the archives. The only exception is van Kol's (1914:33) reference to having met Ck. Sukawati in 1881.

18. According to Robinson (1992:113), an allowance in the range f.15-f.50 (guilders) per month was made to district heads (in Bangli, Gianyar and Karangasem) to compensate for the removal of their right to exact corvee labour. A Dutch report of 1914 (Mailrapport 3/12-14-1360/15:6) however mentions that the salary for "district heads" was f.150 and that the *poenggawa* of Ubud received the "maximum salary" of f.50 but also an extraordinary additional figure of 18409.77 guilders per annum which appears (the paper is damaged and illegible at the critical point) to result from his collection of various other levies, taxes and rentals. His total income, from the Dutch is, according to this document, more than three times as much as the combined salaries of the other six Gianyar *punggawa* and two other officials from Bangli. His son, Ck. Agung recalls however that his annual salary, probably around 1915-9 as having been 2,200 *ringgit* (the Malay unit of currency equal to 2.5 guilder and subsequently 2.5 rupiah) per month (Sukawati 1979:3,10), an even higher figure. Inconsistent as these figures are they lend support to the widespread popular perception of Ck. Sukawati as having been very wealthy and a beneficiary of the Dutch.

19. Balinese perceptions of the Dutch were at best ambiguous. Balinese often "carried on as if the Dutch were not there" (Vickers 1989:73) and Wiener's account (1995:esp.275-300) stresses the Balinese perception of Dutch impotence. Artistic representations of the Dutch tended to portray them as "rapacious but comical" and with "low status in Balinese eyes" (Vickers 1989: caption to Plate 9, see also illustrations in Covarrubias 1994). Other accounts however suggest that they were seen as having the character of *niskala* beings of the lower orders: gross and uncivilised but powerful, unpredictable and therefore dangerous.

20. Ubud, and indeed what I know of other pre-colonial Balinese kingdoms, seem to conform more to the Milner's (1982) model of the Malay *kerajaan* than Geertz' of the *negara*. The latter, apart from downplaying the role of *realpolitik*, is essentially spatial and static in its conception while Milner's *kerajaan* is a more processual model taking into account the

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dynamic balance of a wide range of factors.

21. I could find amongst contemporary members of his own family and the general public of Ubud, only one person with fond memories of Ck. Raka: a former employee, a *parekan* of exemplary loyalty but diminished critical faculties. The turbulent carriage of his corpse, borne reluctantly by the local community to its place of cremation bear witness to this reputation. He is remembered on a larger stage primarily as a political opportunist, collaborator with the Dutch and instigator of repressive violence against his own people (Robinson 1995:169-178).

22. In a sense he was merely continuing the tradition of his father's and other Balinese courts in attracting artists from other kingdoms. It is typical of Ck. Raka's vision and contacts however that he chose a foreigner from beyond Balinese shores. The story of Walter Spies and has been told often enough before (see Boon 1986, Rhodius and Darling 1980, Vickers 1989:105-124 for some of the more critical versions). I will refrain from repeating here what has become a cornerstone in a discourse which has for over half a century served to obscure what Balinese themselves (apart from Gusti Nyoman Lempad) have been doing in Ubud.

23. In this respect his career bears a striking resemblance to that of his maternal uncle and contemporary Gusti Putu Mayun in Blahkiuh (Mengwi), also a Dutch-trained local aristocrat. The resemblance ends here however as Gusti Mayun chose to pursue the local rather than global potential of this combination (Schulte-Nordholt 1991:141).

24. It is unclear when Puri Ubud began to pay (rather than collect) taxes on their massive landholdings. Ck. Agung (Sukawati) recalls, in 1931 being asked to pay taxes overdue from 1923 on his share of his fathers inheritance. Prior to this, according to Robinson (1995:55) 'In the early years of Dutch rule, an interim land tax had been assessed according to a complex of existing and ill-understood regulations.' I suspect however that these may not have come into force until 1908 when the whole of the south came under Dutch control. If it was applied earlier in Gianyar, one of the 'existing regulations' understood (ill- or otherwise) by Schwartz (1906:176) was the exemption of local officials such as *punggawa*, from taxes. This may have been a source of local opinions that Ck. Sukawati was granted exemption from land tax in exchange for his role in facilitating the passage of Gianyar into Dutch hands.

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It is certain that land tax became after 1922 and especially during the 1930s, a considerable burden to many people in Ubud and the resultant unwillingness to own land is often cited as a factor in the high rate of landlessness. It is even claimed that people voluntarily surrendered their land to the *puri* to avoid tax and any tax exemption enjoyed by the *puri* lends credence to such claims.

25. Statistics from this period paint a consistent Bali-wide picture of declining exports, imports, prices, tax payments from the late 1920s through the 1930s. (Bakker 1936, van der Kaaden 1938:44-45, Robinson 25.1992:103,106). Scott (1977:ch.4) describes similar patterns throughout Southeast Asia.

26. Robinson quotes several Dutch sources which give a similar picture from other parts of Bali: of tax debts 'which could only be met through numerous foreclosures - far below the real value of the land' (Hoefstra quoted by Robinson 1995:58). The oral history from Ubud suggests that farmers in this position may have sold or even given their land to the *puri* in exchange for payment of taxes and the right to use it.

Scott (1977:ch.5) records a strikingly similar pattern of peasants trapped between declining export revenues and rising taxes as the cause of rural suffering and ultimately rebellions in Burma and Vietnam during the same period. His argument (1997:ch.1,2) that peasants tend to seek land-tenure arrangements which minimise insecurity in preference to those which maximise income is, incidentally supported by the preference of Ubud farmers to work under the wing of the *puri* rather than owning their own land. The somewhat extraordinary relations of rural production in pre-colonial Ubud are discussed in more depth in my forthcoming dissertation.

27. This theme has been sufficiently explored in my own work (1992) as well as that of others (e.g. Vickers 1989:95-130) that it need not be pursued further here.

28. And it was in the course of this tour that he began the practice, now popular among princes and peddlers alike, of importing wives from all over the world.

29. It is this construction of political entourages through a peculiarly pan-Indonesian/Malay mode of patronage (Conrad 1992:62-66, Errington 1983:206-212, Gullick 1988:97-98) which underlay the military campaigns of Ck.Sukawati in the Wos Valley during the 1990s and the cultural ones of his descendants in the same valley a century later. Indeed the term most commonly used in Ubud for pre-colonial states of all

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sizes, *kerajaan*, rightly translated as 'kingdom', has a literal meaning not too far from that of patronage (Milner 1982:122). It is however an inherently local mode of political organisation, dependent for its effectiveness on a degree of face-to-face contact and shared local ideological beliefs. While most Balinese *puri* have abandoned patronage of this kind in favour of more globally applicable vehicles such as state politics and capitalist enterprise, the uniqueness of Puri Ubud lies in their attempt to develop a hybrid political style of elements derived from and applicable to different political arenas.

30. This has been the official position adopted by Puri Ubud toward politics ever since and has been a factor in a culture of indifference or even antipathy toward any kind of trans-local politics which is the dominant political orientation today.

31. The price rose from Rp.3.50/kg in 1956 to Rp.30 by the end of 1962 and then to Rp.125 before the end of the following year (contemporary newspaper reports quoted by Robinson 1995:238).

32. The branches of Puri Ubud in fact varied considerably in this respect with some members, particularly those of less well-endowed branches entering all these fields. This was not however done systematically or, with a few exceptions, with outstanding success.

33. Those members of Puri Ubud with the largest landholdings reported in excess of 1000 ha. of which some 425 ha. had been redistributed by July 1996.

34.34. Both the Dutch and Indonesian governments reorganised administrative boundaries several times with the subdistrict of Ubud shrinking on each occasion. Despite their loss of formal authority members of Puri Ubud usually occupied the position of district head until 1981 when Ubud became a *kelurahan* (village administered directly by the state) with a head appointed from above.

35. Most people are reluctant to speak of this period, preferring to forget it altogether and in most cases actually knowing little and understanding less of what happened. The widow of one of the alleged PKI "leaders" in Ubud, herself a woman of some education and intelligence, insists that until he was arrested she had no idea of what her husband was involved in and to this day does not really know what it was all about. The accounts of those who are prepared to talk (including Ck. Agung Sukawati in Hilbery 1979:79) are vague but follow a

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consistent pattern varying mainly in the role attributed to the *puri*. For a more general account of this period in Bali see Robinson (1995:273-303).

36. For a general account of this development see Picard (1990) and for its effects in Ubud more specifically see MacRae (1992).

37. The cultural significance of this era of tourism both for host countries and tourist-generating countries seems to me to have been under-estimated. A further research project is planned to redress this deficiency.

38. The well-known Hotel Campuan for example, although established in the 1950s by the *puri* on the site of Walter Spies old house, was revived in the late 1960s by a an Australian journalist who leased it for "\$100" per week, employing local people as staff and ran it in combination with travel agencies in Bali and Australia.

39. I do not mean to suggest that other *puri* are not involved in ritual but that no other has done so on such a scale or so publicly. C.Geertz (1963:99-120) records the move of Puri Tabanan to commerce in response to the loss of their traditional role. The closed gates and high walls of Puri Gianyar reflect its (lack of) relationship with both the local community and tourism. Members of this *puri* are, like those of Karangasem, prominent in politics, academia and professions such as medicine. Puri Bangli has developed very modest tourism interests as I believe the minor *puri* of Krambitan, near Tabanan has done.

40. *Lomba Desa* is a national competition in which villages compete in terms of several criteria of civic excellence defined by central government in accordance with current development ideology. It has now been overshadowed (replaced?) by *Adipura*, an annual competition between larger administrative units, which reflects a more contemporary urbanised vision of the image Indonesian villages should aspire to.

41. A *bale agung* is a raised open pavilion, linear in form and conventionally oriented with its head (*ulu*) uphill (*kaja*). For more detailed discussion of this see my earlier paper (1995).

42. The fraction involved is impossible to estimate but I describe it as significant because their publicly known contributions to temple renovations and ceremonies frequently run into hundreds of millions of rupiah and often far outstrip the combined (cash) contributions of the villages involved.

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43. Balinese rarely refer to their own political forms, past or present, as *negara*. For palaces or courts they use the term *puri* and for the kingdoms controlled by *puri* they use *kerajaan*.

I use the term *negara* here specifically to evoke the sense of C.Geertz's (1980) idiosyncratic use of it to refer to a rather abstract notion of a polity constituted primarily by ritual display. This model clearly did not apply to nineteenth-century Ubud and indeed there is precious little evidence to support its application to any nineteenth-century Balinese kingdoms (Schulte-Nordholt 1988). What is interesting in this context is the way in which Puri Ubud has increasingly come to resemble Geertz's model in the late twentieth century.

44. One of the conclusions which may be drawn from this is that Geertz's model, although supposedly "historical" is actually a synchronic one composed of fragments observed here and there at various times. Had he taken into account the actual historical processes by which the very kingdoms from which he draws his evidence came into being, rose and fell, he may have been forced to different conclusions.

45. Bourdieu is of course not the only one to address the relationship between the symbolic and material dimensions of human intention. Others who in various ways enter into this "dialogue with the ghost of Marx" (Wolf 1982:20) include Geertz (1980), Lansing (1991:Introduction), Mauss (1990), Roseberry (1994:ch.6), Sahlins (1976) and Taussig (1980). This is not the place to pursue the dialogue: my choice of Bourdieu's formulation is provisional and reflects more than anything its easy fit with the facts as they present themselves in Ubud.

46. Obviously not all the economic fruits of tourism flow directly to the *puri* but they benefit the *puri* in symbolic terms by association. It is also tourism which has made possible the spectacular capital gains in the form of inflation of land values of which the *puri* have been prime beneficiaries and it is indeed through very lucrative land/tourism deals that the programme of patronage has been largely financed.

47. In Bourdieu's words: 'The endless reconversion of economic capital into symbolic capital, at the cost of a wastage of social energy, which is the condition for the permanence of domination, cannot succeed without the complicity of the whole group' (1994:189).

48. Puri Ubud is a branch of Puri Peliatan which is in turn the senior branch, albeit arguably, of the tree long since uprooted from its native soil at Sukawati, which was itself a cutting (root division?) from one transplanted to Gelgel from

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Majapahit.

49. Besakih is a major mountain temple of importance for the whole of Bali and associated with the ritually foremost kingdom of Klungkung. It contains many sub-temples and shrines including those of a number of kingdoms subsidiary to Klungkung.

50. Pura Batur refers here to the large temple on the rim of the crater of Mt. Batur, rather than Pura Ulun Danu Batur at Songan. There is a rivalry for symbolic precedence between the adherents of the two temples (Lansing 1991:106-108) in which Pura Batur has some advantage by virtue of their own program of conversion of material into symbolic capital.

51. Ubud may have won this battle but I suspect the war is not yet over. Given the undoubted historical importance of this temple and a local intention to see its status as a major pan-Bali temple (Sad Kahyangan) formally (re)established, I would expect both rival *puri* to be prepared to make substantial further investments here over the next few years. While I have no record of the material resources invested by Puri Ubud these were obviously significant and were particularly evident in the extravagant Ubud-style restoration of a shrine with which they claim association. I would also expect Ubud's future claim to the temple to involve mobilising the symbolic capital stored in the (fact of the) proximity of the former residence of the last king of Sukawati.

My knowledge of Bedulu, Pura Samuan Tiga and the politics of this ceremony (Karya Penyejeg Bumi) is largely anecdotal. I am however grateful to Garret Kam for illuminating comments reflecting profoundly local knowledge.

52. Parisada Hindu Dharma is the official umbrella organisation of Indonesian Hinduism. The full name of the temple is Pura Mandaragiri Semeru Agung. Mount Semeru is said to be the peak of the sacred Mt. Mahameru in India relocated to Java, just as the great mountains Batur and Agung in Bali are relocated fragments of Mt. Semeru. I am grateful to Freek Bakker for copies of some material on Pura Semeru.

53. Further research is planned in the Semeru area. For a comprehensive description of the Hindu communities around Semeru and their religious and political-economic conditions see the writings of Robert Hefner (1985, 1990). I have not yet had the opportunity to visit or learn anything further about the Kutai temple.

54. I am grateful to a dancer, Ross Logan for this insight.