

GROWING RICE AFTER THE BOMB

Where Is Balinese Agriculture Going?

Graeme MacRae

ABSTRACT: Agriculture, once the mainstay of Balinese economy and culture, has been marginalized during the era of tourism-driven development. The decline in tourism since the bombing in Kuta in 2002 has revealed the vulnerability of an economy narrowly based on tourism and has led to rethinkings of future economic development in which agriculture plays a more important role. These rethinkings take two main forms. One is a top-down model of export-oriented production of cash crops and economies of scale — an international model of agro-industry/business. The other consists of a diversity of small-scale local initiatives for sustainable and/or organic production for local markets. This article examines these alternative visions in terms first of their links to international political economic movements and second of their conceptual and moral bases. It argues that this period is, like the Green Revolution, a critical turning point that will determine the future of the economy and culture of Bali.

Bali since the Bomb

Ubud, June 2003

Ubud in mid-2003 is a place of conflicting emotions and priorities. The streets, hotels, and restaurants are almost empty of tourists and people are either bemoaning the situation or at home doing other things. At a recent cremation in my neighborhood its three most successful businessmen huddle together talking in hushed tones about the crisis. The trial of the alleged perpetrators of the bombing in October 2002 that brought the economy to a standstill drags on, ever more inconclusively, while public anger at the people who wrecked the livelihoods if not the lives of the local population is again growing palpably. Others, perhaps of a more intellectual or religious bent, speak of it as a time for introspeksi, for rethinking their identity and the sort of future they want for their children. Further afield, business people and decision-makers are preoc-

cupied with the redesign of an economy whose dependence on the fragile base of tourism has become all too apparent.

Meanwhile, a few hundred meters away, out in the rice fields, it has finally rained, there is at last enough water, and farmers are replanting the second, dry-season crop. These are not the elite of Ubud, they are mostly people with relatively little stake in the tourism economy. In fact many of them are not from Ubud at all, they are from villages a few kilometers away and they work land owned by Ubud people. Most of them are at least fifty years old and the rice they produce is not sold, it is just enough to provide staple food and (equally staple) ritual goods for their families.¹ For cash they either sell other produce or depend on part-time work or work by family members in the cash economy. I ask whether the bomb has had much effect on them: at present they are still eating, but they have little cash for the great unavoidable of modern life: electricity and water bills, school tuition, medical expenses, and of course ritual.

*In other villages all over Bali and as far away as Lombok and East Java, young workers in the tourism and handicrafts sectors are now unemployed and have gone home. Most have neither the skills nor the inclination to work in the fields alongside their (usually elder) brothers or fathers. They hang around the house with their friends, watching Inul on TV, and driving their mothers to distraction.²**

Boeke's model of dual economies no longer has much currency in academic circles, but in the shops and rice fields of Ubud, there are, if not two economies, at least two levels of the economy, that of subsistence and that of tourism, of agricultural production and of cash transactions.³ Most people do not live entirely in one or the other but with one foot in each, their weight variously distributed between the two — the awkwardness of the metaphor expressive of the awkward balancing act involved.

Apart from its obvious effects, in terms both of human tragedy and its gross economic impact, one of the most important and lasting effects of the bomb has been to bring home to Balinese at all levels of society the radical and potentially devastating fragility of an economy built on such a narrow base, especially one so dependent on multiple factors beyond local control. People are reminded in various ways of their ultimate dependence on agricultural production and the interdependence between sectors of the economy.

While much scholarly labor has been expended trying to make sense of the economic crisis in Indonesia, including its agricultural dimensions, little of this work has been either focused on the somewhat atypical subeconomy of Bali, taken the form of in-depth local ethnographic studies, or taken into account cultural as well as material dimensions of agriculture as well as the dynamic relationships between them. Ironically the few works that directly address the crisis in Bali focus largely on the politics of identity, culture, and religion while paying scant attention to agriculture, which Jean Couteau refers to as "fast shrinking

* *Note:* italicized material in this article is drawn from the author's field notes of mid 2003.

into irrelevance."⁴ In late 2003 even the aid/development agencies were devoting their attention to the approaching elections in 2004 rather than the everyday problems of food production.⁵ My own experience of Bali, as well as my reading of various documents representing Balinese thinking about the current crisis, suggests a different starting point: that agriculture remains a major component not only of the material economy of Bali, but also of Balinese thinking about their cultural identity.

The purpose of this essay is to consider the present state of agriculture in Bali and the prospects for the future. It is based first on over a decade of ethnographic experience of rice-farming in the tourism-dominated environment of Ubud; second, on several weeks, in mid 2003, of exploration of a range of new agricultural initiatives in various parts of Bali; and third, on analysis of discussions among government officials, academics and NGO representatives about the future of the Balinese economy.⁶ I identify two schools of thought as to the future direction of agriculture in Bali, broadly sketched but radically opposed in their visions and directions. These are then analyzed in terms of their relationships with the global political-economy of agricultural development and then of their underlying epistemological and moral conceptions. Although the empirical data are preliminary and my interpretations provisional, they are I think sufficient to suggest that Balinese agriculture, economic development, and indeed Balinese culture itself are at a critical turning point.

Agriculture in Bali: Decline, Marginalization, Crisis?

Rural economies all over the world are changing in response to global market processes. This pattern has been especially marked in regions such as Southeast Asia that until a generation ago were predominantly rural and agriculturally based.⁷ Indonesia has been a typical example, with the proportion of GDP generated by agriculture falling from over 30 percent in 1975 to barely half that in 1996, while employment in agriculture has fallen from 62 percent to 46 percent.⁸ Since 1998, agriculture has been comprehensively deregulated as a condition of IMF financial assistance in the wake of the crisis.⁹

Bali is no exception to this pattern — although here the economy has taken a specific form dominated by tourism and related export industries. The Balinese economy has, since the 1970s, undergone comprehensive transformation, from a base of agriculture, to one based primarily on tourism-related services and secondarily on export-focused small industries.¹⁰ While the available statistical evidence of this transformation is neither up-to-date, consistent, nor totally reliable, the overall picture is undeniable:¹¹

1. The proportion of Bali's GDP provided by agriculture has declined steadily — from 66 percent in 1971 to 35 percent in 1989,¹² or, by alternative figures, from 48.95 percent in 1976 to 40.7 percent in 1988.¹³
2. The proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture has also declined steadily — from 67.9 percent in 1971 to 45.15 percent in 1990¹⁴ or alternatively, from 61.6 percent in 1978 to 49.3 percent in 1990.¹⁵
3. Income levels in agriculture have fallen below those in most other sectors of the economy — Rp. 474,000/month as opposed to, for example Rp.

500,000 to Rp. 821,000 in various parts of the tourism sector, Rp. 635,000 in construction and about Rp. 1,000,000 in the civil service. Only manufacturing (Rp. 433,000) is lower, reflecting the part-time, cottage industry status of much of this sector in Bali.¹⁶

4. Farmland has been progressively converted to nonagricultural uses. During the 1980s some 6,000 ha. of irrigated land and the same amount of dry field land was lost to agriculture at a rate of about 1,000 ha. per annum by the end of that decade.¹⁷ The rate of the conversion increased further to about 3,000 ha. per annum in 2003.¹⁸

In other words, progressively fewer productive resources are devoted to agriculture, progressively less of Bali's income is generated from it, and it is progressively more difficult for individuals or households to make a living from agriculture. Agriculture is in decline in absolute terms, but it is also being progressively marginalized in an economy dominated by tourism. Moreover, farming has been culturally marginalized. Rice was, for at least a millennium, at the heart of Balinese culture and being a good rice farmer was, until a couple of generations ago, one of the core elements of Balinese male identity. The young now see rice farming as hard, dirty, boring, and less than glamorous compared to the multifarious attractions and possibilities of the world of tourism.

Growing Rice in Ubud, 1993-2003

Farmers in Ubud during the 1990s, observing their neighbors in the tourism industry prosper while they themselves struggled to make ends meet, used to observe wryly that they might be better off selling their land, banking the proceeds, and living off the interest, rather than sweating in their rice fields for what seemed like ever-diminishing and uncertain returns. This unequal equation was the product of several undeniable material factors: the astronomical inflation of the value of land during this period, the rising costs of inputs such as seed and fertilizers, and the selling price of their produce, determined not by any market process, but kept artificially low by government decree.¹⁹ But it reflected also a perception, less tangible perhaps but deeply felt, that the place of farming in the order of things was not what it used to be.

In a town like Ubud, a world of tourists and facilities for servicing them, by the late 1990s the growing middle class drove new cars and carried mobile phones, while even employees in shops and hotels had motorbikes and smart Western-style clothes. For the generation that has grown up taking all this for granted, the prospect of long days in the fields, up to their knees in mud, sweating in the heat, and returning home past the chic shops and restaurants with aching muscles, dirty clothes, and a hoe over their shoulder, holds little attraction. To them the world of the rice fields is a relic from the past, the domain of those too old or backward to partake of the advantages of the present.²⁰ During my fieldwork since 1993, the majority of farmers of my acquaintance have been, with a few notable exceptions, men of middle age or older, lacking the requisite combination of resources to engage in any but the most menial levels of the tourism economy. Many were not landowners, but sharecroppers on the land of more affluent people whose ownership of land provided them with other

means of livelihood. As the population of Ubud ages and younger generations become progressively more integrated into the new economy, as well as less inclined to agricultural labor, increasing amounts of the work on fields around Ubud is done on sharecropping or contract bases by individuals or teams from villages located nearby, but with less access to the tourism economy.²¹

Concurrently with this transformation of the demographics of labor, the actual availability of agricultural land has diminished steadily as rice fields are drained, filled, and converted to sites for hotels, restaurants, and shops. In 1996, Subak Muwa, with some of the rice fields closest to the center of Ubud, had most of its land already converted to commercial use, and only twenty-five of its ninety original members were still farming. The *pekaseh* (head) was making arrangements for the ritual conversion of its temple, dedicated to the deities associated with rice and irrigation to one for the gods of commerce.²²

Perceptions of the Problem

This pattern has been clear to foreign observers for some time. Over a decade ago Sean Foley, in a report for the Bali Tourist Development Plan identified the essential contradictions inherent in the state of agriculture: increasing population and demand but lesser increase in agricultural production, reduction of land available for increasing production, and farmers not sharing in the general increase in prosperity through tourism. In short a scenario of unsustainability and reduced food security.²³

Balinese, particularly in the tourist areas, have generally been less willing to recognize this as a problem. There have been a few voices of dissent, however, small and muted but consistent: Ida Ayu (Dayu) Mas, an academic turned social reformer and sustainable tourism operator; Nyoman Gelebet, engineer, architect, academic, and fierce critic of the social, economic, and environmental consequences of tourism-led development; and Luh Ketut Suryani, psychiatrist, academic, and social critic. But, while these individuals were generally respected, their views were, until the bomb, more or less ignored.

Bali was insulated from the worst effects of the 1997-98 economic crisis by the continuing flow of foreign exchange through tourism and related export industries, until the Kuta bombing of a tourist spot in October 2002, when the flow stopped abruptly. As the awful reality began to sink in, people began to interpret the event in various ways and draw various conclusions.²⁴ Within days public figures and commentators of diverse expertise began to point out that "for a long time the development priority of agriculture has been downgraded to subsidise (*menunjang*) tourism...it has received very little budget allocation...government has done very little to support the well-being of farmers."²⁵ By early 2003, the head of the government team investigating the impact of the bomb likened the neglect of farming to a "deep wound" to the Balinese economy, causing "confusion" to government and public alike, and only when agriculture was "worked on in parallel" with tourism would this be resolved.²⁶ Meanwhile a senior religious figure was lamenting the decline of the *subak* system in the face of conversion of land to nonagricultural uses and the failure of government to protect it.²⁷

In January 2003, a group calling themselves Solidarity of Young Artists, collaborated with a *subak* (farmers irrigation cooperative) on the rural/urban fringe of Denpasar, to produce an exhibition, using a rice field as a gallery, consisting of new oversized versions of traditional scarecrows (*Jelaku*) and paintings arranged around the field. The scarecrows were designed to scare away not birds but “those rich people who want to buy the paddy fields in order to build villas or malls”; the paintings depicted not the usual scenes of bucolic harmony but “the demise of paddy fields and the Balinese agrarian culture.” The point of the whole exercise was to “provide a medium through which artists, farmers and other people can interact with each other and reflect upon the state of our agricultural sector,” which is that “the development process has separated us from our cultural and spiritual roots and, simultaneously, marginalized our farmers — the keepers of those roots.”²⁸

Through the first half of 2003, in response to the general sense of crisis, a series of seminars and think-tank sessions were held in which a range of senior decision-makers, influential commentators, academic experts, and representatives of government and NGOs exchanged their analyses of the present and their ideas for the future. At the same time others were working out their ideas in the form of practical initiatives. Although a range of positions are evident, the positions can be grouped into two schools of thought.

Visions for the Future

The Dominant Discourse: Agro-Industry and Agro-Business

In early 2003 Nyoman Erawan, one of Bali’s leading economists, presented a paper in which he analyzed the present state of the economy in terms of socio-economic factors such as equity and human well-being as well as more conventional economic indicators such as growth and structural change. He also proposed a move to a “community economy” (*ekonomi kerakyatan*) in which concepts such as “participation,” “justice,” “democracy,” and “environmental friendliness” would feature prominently.²⁹ In terms of the balance between sectors of the economy, Erawan identified farming as the highest priority. Within the farming sector he identified the smallness of holdings (an average of 0.72 ha. in 1993) as a major obstacle to productivity and incomes in the sector. While his paper is short on detail regarding the implementation of his strategy, he characterizes his overall model of development according to two main criteria, “bottom-up” and “market-oriented.”³⁰ In conversation with him, he confirmed that he was thinking in terms of a farmer-led shift away from subsistence to cash crops driven by market demand.³¹

While Erawan seems on the one hand to be motivated by critiques of past paradigms of development and their human consequences and a genuine concern to implement such concepts as “community economy,” “bottom-up,” “empowerment,” and “participation,” his own model appears to be based ultimately on an international model of export-driven market production of cash crops. In other words he seems to be falling back onto or seeking a compromise with the kinds of models whose past consequences he is trying to avoid. This perspec-

tive, including its inherent contradictions, appears to represent an emergent dominant discourse about economic development that runs through official/elite thinking at both academic and governmental levels.

In mid-2003 a draft proposal for a new “development strategy” for the island was prepared by a multidisciplinary team (of which Erawan was also a member), comprising representatives of provincial government, economists both academic and practicing, as well as a major bank. The team argued that the state of the agricultural sector was the result of two inherent “structural weaknesses”: the small scale of most farmers’ holdings and the government’s policy of holding the price of rice artificially low.³² The team proposes a new vision and strategy for the economy based on “sectoral reform” and combining “community participation” with “market orientation.” It identifies the agricultural sector as the “first priority” to be developed in conjunction with a broader program of rural development incorporating physical infrastructure such as electricity, water supply, telecommunications, and roads, as well as development of human resources through education. The mode of agriculture implicit throughout the team’s strategy is “agro-industry and agro-business.”³³

A panel of senior academics was convened in Denpasar soon afterwards to discuss this proposal. While their responses addressed a range of issues, none of the academics (with the partial exception of G.N. Gorda³⁴) questioned — and most endorsed, at least implicitly — (1) the perception that agriculture had been marginalized in relation to tourism, (2) the need to prioritize the agricultural sector, and (3) that the way to do this was to reorient it to competition in export markets and “re-integrate” it with other sectors of the economy.³⁵

This line of thought is not new in Indonesia. Through the 1990s, the necessity for Indonesia to embrace agro-business was discussed in periodic governmental pronouncements, from the presidential level down and in seminars of academics and officials.³⁶ Now there seems to be an embedded consensus of official thinking on agricultural development — defined in terms of a discourse that seeks to combine two sets of ideas:

1. Ideas based on an international top-down development model familiar from World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO) policies — a model of structural reform of the whole sector, based on economies of scale, and a reorientation to cash crops capable of competing in export markets — a model of agro-business and agro-industry. This is essentially the dominant model already being imposed throughout post-crisis Indonesia.³⁷
2. Concepts such as “community economics” and “participation,” “justice,” “democracy,” and “environmental friendliness,” ideas now finding their way into even World Bank development-speak, but more commonly associated with community-based grass-roots NGO models. The emerging official consensus seems to be trying to combine two somewhat different development models, at least at the level of discourse. When it comes to the level of pragmatic implementation, however, the discourse is short on detail.³⁸

Alternative Approaches: Organic and Sustainable

There are however alternative visions of the future of agriculture in Bali — visions embodied not in policy documents but in a range of small-scale practical initiatives. Describing themselves in terms such as “sustainable” and “organic,” these originate not in the traditional rice-growing sector nor in the government/academic/development sector — but in various combinations of expatriates and locals who have been influenced to varying degrees by aspects of global health and environmental movements. These people are committed to a range of visions of development and agriculture rooted in ideas of sustainability based on local production of healthy organic produce, integrated with small but profitable niche-markets to tourists and export. They are already experimenting with crops and methods, producing and marketing with varying degrees of success.

Dayu Mas is an academic from a high-ranking Brahmana family who twenty years ago became concerned about the direction of development in Bali, especially the growing gap between tourism and agricultural sectors — both of which she saw as developing in inappropriate ways.³⁹ She bought some land in a village that was very poor but not far from major tourism centers. She developed it as a low-key resort for tourists, mostly European and Japanese, who were interested in a direct experience of ordinary village life, traditional culture, and the opportunity to contribute to community development projects. The tourists pay well and she has reinvested most of the proceeds into local community development projects. She has also bought some *sawah* (irrigated rice fields) on which she is experimenting with old rice varieties and organic agricultural methods. One of the main points she makes is that tourism can be harnessed to socially beneficial development — but also to supporting more appropriate forms of agriculture.

Far to the west, on a road into the mountains, is the Prana Dewi Mountain Resort (www.pranadewiresort.com) — another attempt to combine appropriate tourism with appropriate agriculture. The resort is owned by a local man married to a German woman, who after a health crisis, turned to yoga and



Traditional organic rice, Prana Dewi Resort (Credit: All photographs courtesy of the author.)

natural foods, which now form the basis of their tourist enterprise — a special resort for yoga and healing retreats. They have several hectares of family land on which they have built a small hotel and restaurant — but also substantial fields of traditional rice grown organically as well as vegetables and fruits. All they grow is consumed in their own business — but they are trying to persuade and assist other farmers in the area to go the same way — because of the prices that such produce commands in the tourist and expatriate markets.

In the rapidly urbanizing triangle between Kuta, Denpasar, and Krobokan, among whole streets of manufacturers of antiques to order and ready-made “traditional” houses from all over the archipelago, is the Sunrise International School. Three days a week, in front of the school the “Sunrise Organic Market” convenes. Like the school, the market serves the substantial expatriate community centered in Seminyak, among whom there is a considerable demand for fresh, chemical-free produce, especially for their children. Essentially a retail market for goods from elsewhere, the market also has a small organic vegetable garden, organized, like the market itself, by a woman from New Zealand and worked by one employee. Although modest in scale the market is evidence of a local demand for organic produce and of an embryonic network of suppliers.

Besides the Sunrise Market, there is a health food shop and restaurant run by an American woman in Ubud and the IDEP Foundation (www.idepfoundation.org), which runs training courses in permaculture and organic food preparation. These two enterprises, although not large, are further evidence of a small but growing niche market for organic, chemical-free foods.⁴⁰ This market is composed largely of the community of Western expatriates, especially those with children — people able and willing to pay higher-than-normal prices for organic or at least reasonably chemical-free food. Some of these people have been motivated to start their own organic enterprises.



The gardens at John Hardy's Silver factory (www.johnhardy.com).

John Hardy is a designer and manufacturer of silver jewelry sold mostly in North America. He has been based in Bali since the 1970s and his entire design/production facility is spread over several hectares of converted rice fields about half an hour from Denpasar.

Walking through the narrow door in an ordinary-looking mud wall is like walking into a Balinese painting — a world of winding pebbled paths among gardens and trees, over little bamboo bridges, past mud and thatch huts. But these unprepossessing buildings contain the offices, design studios, and production workshops of a global silver industry. Some five hundred people work here every day. And the plants in the gardens are mostly edible — passion fruit vines, vegetable and fruit trees, and even miniature terraces planted with traditional Balinese rice varieties. There are kitchens too — preparing a midday meal for the entire staff and visitors. The food and the gardens are all organic — no artificial fertilizers or pesticides are used.

As his children grew, Hardy realized that he could not feed them any locally produced food with confidence that it was not heavily laced with chemicals, so he began growing his own vegetables organically. He reasoned further that “Balinese are great imitators” and that if he could make a success of growing food organically it would catch on, so he began expanding the scope of his project. He is now in partnership with an American couple with experience in organic production. Their company, C.V. Bening, produces mainly vegetables and chicken, most of which is sold directly to hotels and restaurants toward the upper end of the market. They are also experimenting with export of natural sea salt. Business has been somewhat curtailed by the decline in tourism since the bombing and it is still (mid 2003) being subsidized by the silver business, but they are confident that it will become self-sufficient in time. The medium-term aim is “a 100 percent farmer-owned co-op for organic gourmet produce... tak[ing] over what is currently imported, with the possibility of export as well.”⁴¹ Hardy’s ultimate vision is even grander — for Bali to become totally organic — the organic garden of the world.

Others are also supplying the niche market for organic produce, especially salad vegetables, to the hotel and restaurant sector. The central mountains, with their more temperate climate, have long been the vegetable-growing region of Bali. With the growth of demand for vegetables for the tables of tourists, this sector has grown steadily and successful growers have prospered.⁴² A minority have turned to organic production, for what appear to be primarily economic rather than health or ideological reasons.

Early morning in Candi Kuning, a scruffy little market-town in the mountains overlooking a postcard-famous temple-in-a-lake. The air is cool and unlike on the plains the market is not yet active and there are not many people around. This, like most mountain regions of Indonesia, is vegetable-growing country and the central crossroads is graced not with the usual florid statue of heroic figures from the Hindu epics, but with a concrete corn cob, less-than-heroic in size and faded to a less-than-appetizing creamy color. I am looking for a man called Tonny Hermianto, who I’ve been told grows organic vegetables here. I can’t find him in Jalan Wortel (Carrot Street) or in the streets named after any other vegetable but I eventually locate him in a nameless street on the edge of town where he does in fact grow all the vegetables immortalized in the street names.



Tonny Hermanto with his magic potions

Tonny is of Chinese descent and from North Bali, more cosmopolitan than the south and with a long tradition of trade and commercial innovation. His family were farmers but he moved to Candi Kuning six years ago to get into the vegetable business. He now grows over 3 ha. of healthy-looking vegetables, and for the past two years he has not used any chemical fertilizers or pesticides. His crops look extremely healthy and he says his yields are better than before, he has had no problems with pests or disease, and his production costs are lower. His system is based on a fermented bacterial agent called EM4, which he buys in yellow plastic bottles from a supplier in Denpasar. Mixed with water, it is used to activate his compost, made of a mixture of rice-mill waste and chicken manure and as an all-purpose tonic/medicine/pesticide that he sprays over the whole farm once a week. Since he has been using it, he says, his production has increased dramatically, his pest and disease problems have virtually disappeared, and his costs have decreased. Before the bombing he sold all he could produce, at prices some 20 percent above those for ordinary vegetables, directly to supermarkets and large hotels in Denpasar. Business has been down since the bombing but he has not been as badly affected as others. A few other farmers in the area, seeing his success, have begun to follow suit. He plans to expand by providing capital to other farmers to get the same system going, guaranteeing sales of produce and taking a share of the profits.

A few kilometers away — on the north side of the mountains is an even larger commercial organic producer, called Golden Leaf. This is owned by a businessman based in Denpasar but is managed by a young Javanese man who learned organic methods from a legendary Dutch pastor who has been growing organically in Bogor for several decades. They use neither magic bullets nor plastic bottles — just good solid organic principles — including compost made of

chicken-farm wastes and rice-mill wastes and sprays made up of a mixture of local oils and herbs. They too supply the boutique hotel and restaurant trade. While the manager is motivated by pure organic principles, the owner of the business thinks that it is the combination of low-input costs and high prices that make the effort worthwhile.⁴³

Although the views of these individuals (and others not mentioned here) differ considerably in motivation and practice, what they have in common is a belief in the value, on economic as well as health and environmental grounds, of forms of agriculture significantly different from the agro-industry/business model. Such views remain in a minority, and consist in practice only of small enterprises and experiments often supported by foreign money. They are however also linked in various ways to a global movement for which there is increasing support, at the level of public opinion and in informed professional and academic discussion. Sustainable agriculture is one of the mantras of current development thinking and such things as returns to traditional local crops and chemical-free production are talked about in serious development publications.⁴⁴ So in a sense these projects are actually doing what part of the dual rhetoric of the dominant model refers to.⁴⁵

The Global Political Economy of Agriculture

While the success of the Green Revolution in increasing production is generally accepted, so too are its negative side effects acknowledged. In addition to environmental and resource impacts such as stress on the water supply and soil fertility and decreased energy efficiency and pollution, these side effects have included increased dependence on cash and often credit for inputs such as seed and fertilizer; in many cases this results in a decrease rather than an increase in food security.⁴⁶ Several writers have taken this critique a step further, arguing that these are no mere unintended side effects, but that the underlying intention of this whole phase of development policy and practice was to facilitate the penetration of capitalist agri-business into territories previously inaccessible to it by virtue of their adherence to traditional methods and local inputs and consumption.⁴⁷

Doug Porter and David Craig have made a similar argument in relation to a new preoccupation of the development industry current a couple of decades after the Green Revolution: "Poverty Reduction Strategies" (PRS). Of one such program in Vietnam they write: "While the poverty implications are played up in the title and objectives...[they] clearly have global integrating and pathsmoothing for foreign and private sector investment as their major goal."⁴⁸ In other words the dominant development paradigm continues to facilitate capitalist penetration of new markets in the name of current development priorities.

I would suggest a similar process in the direction proposed for Balinese agriculture. The emerging official discourse is oriented to increasing the participation of Balinese farmers in global trade and hence their inevitable dependence on global markets, with all the attendant vulnerabilities. The supposed advantages to Balinese, whether producers or consumers, are assumed but not ad-

dressed directly in the discussions to date. What is clear though is that this approach will open the door to larger agri-business operators of various kinds. While the concrete details of its implementation are not yet clear, they are more easily imagined than the supposed implementation of the attendant rhetoric of "community," "democracy," and "participation." Why then the rhetoric that suggests something different from blatant marketization, something more people- and environment-friendly?

The Ideological Repackaging of the Neoliberal Agenda

According to Porter and Craig, the rhetoric of "Poverty Reduction" serves the classic ideological functions of obfuscation and mystification, albeit perhaps in new ways. They analyze the discursive packaging not only of Poverty Reduction strategies, but of "Social Inclusion" strategies of "Third Way" governments such as the current Labour governments in Britain and New Zealand. Since the mid 1990s, they argue, neoliberalism has been increasingly on the back foot, against a rising tide of critiques at both local and global levels and, most importantly, from within its own ranks as well as from outside.⁴⁹

They refer to Karl Polanyi's model of "double movement" in market/society relations, whereby traditional relations are first disrupted, then "re-embedded." The impetus for this second movement comes from "... 'enlightened reactionaries' ... mitigating market-led disruption of the social order." In the present situation those picking up this task "are as likely to be functionaries within the international financial institutions or central governments... as activists within increasingly engaged NGOs... Each in various ways contests and regulates the market orientation, giving it a human face or policy limit."⁵⁰

The result of these efforts is a series of strategies to "re-embed" neoliberal policy/practice in a more inclusive and humane regime, or at least to repackage it in a way that gives this appearance. Those previously marginalized are brought into the global economy by means of removal of trade barriers. Earlier brutal sink-or-swim ideologies are recast in terms such as "inclusion," "participation," "social investment," "cohesion," and "security." Practices of governance are rejigged to work through local "communities" and "partnerships" with "civil society" groups.⁵¹ In other words, the moment Porter and Craig refer to as inclusive liberalism is marked by attempts, practical as well as ideological, to re-embed market liberalism into concrete local social contexts, give it a human face, and repackage it in people- and society-friendly forms, drawing attention away from its contradictions, but without changing its essential dynamic.

The Emerging Policy: Balinese Agriculture as "Inclusive Liberalism"

Seen from this point of view the emergent policy direction for Balinese agriculture begins to look like a similar repackaging of old wine in new bottles. Consider again the dualisms in Erawan's proposal: "bottom up" and "market-oriented," "community economy supported by market mechanisms which are fair/just," "principles of justice and democracy," "inclusion (*pemihakan*) empowerment, and protection of the vulnerable (*lemah*)," "create a healthy cli-

mate of competition and market-friendly interventions," "use of land and resources which is fair, transparent and productive," "poverty reduction (*penanggulangan kemiskinan*)," and "pro-poor growth."⁵²

Or of the draft strategy itself: "participative development," "fairness and equality," increase regional competitiveness through the concept Corporation Bali," "conducive investment climate supported by human resources capable of responding to the era of free trade."⁵³

Or the expert responses to the draft strategy: "equality (*kesetaraan*), equity (*kebersamaan*) and cooperation (*usaha bersama*)," "farming must be seen as agribusiness and agroindustry," "acknowledge, create, empower...increase participation, equity and partnership (*kemitraan*)."⁵⁴

How have these ideas come into Balinese development thinking? Indonesia has, since the 1980s, been engaged in a process of progressive liberalization of its economy including the agricultural sector. While some parts of this have been undertaken voluntarily and unilaterally, others have taken the form of negotiated agreements with the WTO, Asean, and APEC. In 1996 Indonesia became a participant in the Uruguay Round agreements administered by the WTO. Since the crisis of 1997-98, Indonesia has been a client of the IMF, and not one in a position to dictate terms.⁵⁵ In other words, Indonesia is well integrated into the global development industry, as are the individuals involved in the drafting of policy in/for Bali. More specifically in Bali, in 1997, local, provincial, and national governments entered into an arrangement with the World Bank and other donors for the Bali Urban Infrastructure Project.⁵⁶ Several of the key members of the planning and decision-making bodies have already worked on World Bank-funded projects and are familiar with the processes and discourses involved. Current development policy in Bali is being drafted within, not outside, the framework of world development industry discourse.

The point here is that the dominant discourse emerging from the policy-making elite in Bali may be seen as a local variant of a model currently dominant in the global development industry. This model is essentially one of continued market liberalization, which in the case of agriculture takes the form of increased integration into the global agro-industry/business system. The rhetorical packaging of inclusion, participation, community economy, and environment-friendliness, however well-intentioned by its "enlightened reactionary" proponents, is likewise part of this global trend and is likely in effect to amount to little more than window dressing to obscure more fundamental changes taking place.

Alternative Visions and the Global Political Economy of Agriculture

"The struggle...is not North versus South, it is against the neoliberal model that oppresses the people of the North and South."

— European farmers at WTO meeting, Cancun⁵⁷

The alternative initiatives discussed above have been developed by small groups of people working more or less independently. They present themselves

likewise primarily as local solutions to local problems. Some refer explicitly to traditional Balinese agriculture as a source of inspiration as well as a practical model to follow. They are thus in one sense embodiments of local resistance to the global/modern model of agriculture inherent in the dominant discourse discussed above. However their aims and model of practice are also consistent with those of a global movement of resistance to the dominant agro-industry/business model.

Outside the WTO meeting at Cancun in 2003, thousands of small farmers and indigenous cultivators from all over the world protested against “the devastating effects of the liberalisation of agriculture...the policy of trade opening, the globalizing policies, the neoliberal model and imperialism that are devastating our economy...and our agricultural systems...the neoliberal model that oppresses the people of the North and South...globalisation, which is just a code word for imperialism...people are starving because of the policies of the IMF, World Bank and WTO.”⁵⁸ A Korean farmer publicly committed suicide to make the point that such policies are “killing small farmers.”⁵⁹ What they share is not just resistance to the dominant model, but an alternative model, based on traditional/local practices but reframed also in terms that link them into a new global movement.

[T]o prioritise food supply sovereignty, rural development and the well-being of farmers...build up our own alternatives and the right to biodiversity...to strengthen the alternative project of food sovereignty of the people. We must defend...the patrimony of the people...the right of producing our own food, to define our agricultural priorities.⁶⁰ Much the same sentiments were expressed a year earlier in a paper prepared by several farmers organizations, including an Indonesian one, for the World Summit for Social Development in Bali in June 2002.⁶¹

The alternative initiatives in Bali are hardly the work of struggling indigenous or peasant farmers, indeed they may at first appear to be the playthings of a relatively privileged elite. However their vision is in principle similar to that articulated at Cancun: at once a critique of and a practical alternative to the dominant agro-business/industry model. While their projects are local, their instigators are linked in various ways to wider networks of knowledge and vision: a global model of organic/sustainable agriculture. Although their enterprises are mostly dependent on expatriate or tourist markets, virtually all I spoke to explicitly articulated a larger vision in which they saw their own projects as models or vehicles for the revitalisation of Balinese agriculture and future supply to export markets. Most were actively working to engage with other local farmers and encourage them into similar methods of production and marketing.⁶²

They may, I suggest, be seen as another manifestation of a global movement of resistance to the agro-industry/business model. This movement takes specific forms, indeed originates in, response to particular local conditions. In the case of Bali mainstream rice farmers, although most adversely affected by the present situation, are also those least well equipped to resist or critique it, let alone develop alternatives. Those better positioned are not an homogenous group, but they are all responding to the situation in ways that simultaneously reflect

the distinctive local economy of Bali, draw upon broader models of organic/sustainable agriculture, and position themselves more or less explicitly in opposition to the dominant model.

The various solutions proposed to the present crisis in Balinese agriculture fall into two broad categories that correspond to opposing tendencies in the global political economy of agriculture. One, which dominates mainstream agricultural development thinking, is a model that may be summarized as agribusiness/industrial. The other is a broadly based global movement of resistance to this paradigm that takes a variety of local forms, of which the various moves toward organic/sustainable/traditional agriculture in Bali are manifestations. While I have identified and discussed these in terms of political economy and ideology, it may be useful also to consider them in terms of the systems of knowledge and moral visions embodied in them.⁶³

Agricultural Epistemologies and Moral Ecologies

“...the real significance of the Green Revolution is conceptual not technological...its real failing is ideological, and its long-term viability is put in doubt by the immorality of its ecology.”⁶⁴

Michael Dove and Daniel Kammen argue that agricultural practices are embodiments not only of materially economic and ecological models but also of epistemological, conceptual, and moral ones. These models relocate the problems of local agricultural production into spatially wider and temporally longer social and natural contexts. Dove and Kammen show how an indigenous Dayak analysis of naturally occurring mast-fruiting of forest trees in terms of reciprocity between human and natural domains, forms the conceptual/moral basis of Dayak swidden agriculture. This, they suggest further, is directly related to the well-documented technical efficiency and sustainability of swidden cultivation, as well as socially integrative and famine-averting functions that flow from the system of distribution. The Green Revolution package of biotechnological transformations on the other hand is, they argue, based on a model of maximum extraction from which notions of reciprocity, either social or environmental, are absent and that is artificially isolated from both its immediate social context of distribution as well as the wider and longer-term practical issues of dealing with the effects of poor harvests.⁶⁵

Their point is that the social, ecological, technical, and moral aspects of agricultural systems are inherently connected and should not be analytically separated. This is no mere idealist analysis either abstracted from or causative of its material context. It points toward the moral/conceptual dimensions embedded in material practice and the weaknesses of analyses that fail to take these into account. We will proceed therefore to consider briefly the conceptual/moral dimensions of the various agricultural ideas and practices in Bali.

Traditional Wet-Rice Cultivation

Wet-rice cultivation was, until the Green Revolution, deeply embedded in a nexus of local social relations and symbolic meaning that I have referred to else-

where, following James Scott, as a “moral economy.”⁶⁶ Rice was grown primarily for household subsistence, while surpluses were ideally exchanged within a system of reciprocity between kin and neighbors. Selling rice was rare, done reluctantly; and — from the point of view of the village moral economy — viewed with at the least mild disapproval.⁶⁷ The production cycle of planting, growth, harvest, storage, and consumption was inextricable from a corresponding cycle of ritual, as was the irrigation system on which production depended.⁶⁸ Not surprisingly rice held a correspondingly central place in ritual, as a medium of exchange with various categories of *niskala* (unseen) beings.⁶⁹

Rice cultivation also took place within a range of socioeconomic frameworks including complex sharecropping systems and centralized systems of redistribution by precolonial rulers.⁷⁰ Rice fields were later taxed by the Dutch colonial regime and the benefits of ownership of productive land came to be seen in relation to the liability of taxation.⁷¹ Rice was a significant export crop as early as 1820 and a proportion of production was bought and sold.⁷² Such nonlocal, asymmetrical or commercial transactions of rice were viewed with a marked ambivalence, especially from the point of view of village moral economy. The transactions were however circumscribed by a set of ritual processes that symbolically transformed and sanctified these morally less-than-ideal practices into ones more culturally acceptable.

Commercial transactions are presided over by two main deities, Rambut Sedana and Dewi Melanting. Rambut Sedana is regarded as the deification of wealth in the form of money, but he is often represented in a pair known as Sri Sedana. His other half, Dewi Sri, is the deity embodied in the rice plant, the most elemental form of prosperity. Their pairing represents the transformation, by the market process of rice-wealth into money-wealth. Dewi Melanting is the deity of the Pura Melanting, the temples associated with marketplaces. There are several stories about her: in one she is the daughter of Dewi Sri, in another she is explicitly given jurisdiction over those natural resources that pass through the market process. In both cases what is symbolically represented, deified, and sanctified is the process of transformation of primary agricultural produce into monetarized, commercial prosperity.⁷³

The entire system of rice growing, from irrigation to consumption, was thus embedded in a moral order encompassing relations that might be described as *ecological*, between people and the natural environment; *economic*, between producers, distributors, and consumers; and *sociopolitical*, between those occupying various positions of power within the relations of production.

Late Twentieth-Century Transformations

This system underwent further transformations in the latter half of the twentieth century, beginning with the economic crises of the 1950s and culminating in another economic crisis in the late 1990s. The most dramatic transformations, however, were the Green Revolution and the general economic transformation driven by tourism. Dove and Kammen argue that the “real significance” of the Green Revolution “is conceptual not technological, ... its real failing is ideological, and ... its long-term viability is put in doubt by the immorality of its ecology.”⁷⁴

In the case of Bali, the unhitching of cropping cycles from old religious calendars undermined the ecological basis of water management and pest control but only partly undermined the conceptual/moral basis that is more durably embedded in ritual cycles maintained religiously even if not fully understood.⁷⁵ The rest of the Green Revolution package, of high-yield varieties (HYVs) of seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and government extension directives, have had a similar effect: on the one hand all but destroying the base of knowledge embedded in traditional practice but on the other, maintaining and reinforcing the institution through which they are implemented, the *subak*, somewhat stripped of the fullness of its former meaning but retaining nevertheless its social form and customary usages (*awig-awig*).⁷⁶ Farmers continue to farm more or less as they have always done, but with the meaning of farming reduced to little more than a calculus of inputs and outputs.

The New Official Consensus Model

The model embedded in the emerging consensus of official thinking is no longer that of the Green Revolution but at the level of morality it retains not dissimilar premises. The critique of the small size of holdings and the perceived need for economies of scale are derived from measures of economy and competitiveness embedded in commercial market exchange rather than the values of local reciprocity let alone subsistence. Likewise the orientation to export reinforces these new values but removes their point of reference even further to an anonymous regional or even world economy. Like the Green Revolution model it simply ignores the ecological/environmental context as a given, presumably to be managed by techno-economic inputs of some kind. One might say it is a model devoid of morality but this is to miss the important point that it too embodies a set of conceptual/moral assumptions. These lie not in the forms of local belief or ritual practice, but in the dispersed but omnipresent morality of global free market ideology, brought to Bali by the World Bank and IMF and articulated by alliances between the Indonesian government, international development agencies, and local think tanks and planning bodies. The rhetoric of "community economy," "participation," and "justice" is likewise directly from the moral ideology/language in which this global belief system seeks increasingly to clothe itself: in other words a moral economy.

Organic/Sustainable Alternatives

While the plans, experiments, projects, and enterprises I have lumped under the label sustainable/organic vary considerably in scope and intention they all embody, to varying degrees, essentially similar assumptions about relationships between agricultural production, resources, environment, and local community. These assumptions are radically different from those of the official model described above, but ironically are equally global in origin. While the people I spoke to tended to articulate their visions more in local than global terms, and often in terms of return to traditional practices, they were clearly informed by Western/global discourses, embodied in their use of terms such as "sustainable" and "organic." For example one of the American partners in C.V. Bening has a

degree in sustainable agriculture from a U.S. university and was managing an organic farm there before coming to Bali. The IDEP Foundation is closely linked to the global permaculture network and part of their mission is to “strengthen national and international networks and methods of learning and information exchange...focusing on sustainable community development.”⁷⁷

Dove and Kammen ask who is now taking “the role of forest spirits in the moral ecology of the tribesmen” in regulating contemporary systems of resource management. Their preliminary answer is that it might be “international environmentalism, the new moral authority of the emerging global order...after the scientific and development authorities have forsaken it.”⁷⁸ The evidence presented above suggests that while the old moral ecology of traditional agriculture has been largely forgotten, it is the pioneers of organic/sustainable agriculture who have assumed this role in Bali.

Conclusion: Agri-Culture and Bali-Culture

“The development process has separated us from our cultural and spiritual roots and, simultaneously, marginalized our farmers—the keepers of those roots.”⁷⁹

There is little doubt that agriculture, especially traditional rice cultivation, has been marginalized in the new economy of Bali, to the point where it is in serious decline and is in many cases simply not economically sustainable. The evidence presented here suggests that the future of agriculture in Bali now hangs in the balance between two broadly defined alternative paths. Although one is packaged in some of the language of the other, they are in fact diametrically opposed at all levels, from their relationships with larger political-economic factors to the epistemological and moral models they embody. The choice to be made will, like the Green Revolution, have far-reaching consequences, not only for agriculture itself, but also for the whole shape of Bali’s economic and cultural future. This choice, put rather crudely, is between becoming a small and not very powerful player in a global system dominated by giant multinational corporations and economic institutions and retaining local control over agricultural production.

This is a choice not just about agriculture, but about the kind of food that future generations will eat and how they will access it; about the kind of agrarian economy that will determine divisions of labor, demographic patterns, and ultimately village structures; about new patterns of wealth and poverty. It has been argued that Balinese culture is now so integrated with the economic and cultural processes of tourism-driven development that it has all but lost its grounding in agrarian relationships with land and natural processes and the deities who preside over both. So this choice about agriculture may also be a “last-chance” choice about the future of Balinese culture.

Postscript: 2004

Since the research on which this article was based a number of government-sponsored initiatives toward organic production have occurred. An arti-

cle in *Bali Post*⁸⁰ reported that the Gianyar Department of Agriculture (Dinas Pertanian) are working with a private firm producing “non-factory” fertilizers. They are encouraging farmers to use these to avoid possible shortages of chemical fertilizers as well as for environmental and health reasons. At the same time the department was also running a trial of organically grown rice.⁸¹ This followed a similar experiment in East Java.⁸² A few months later the head of a national farmers association (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia) spoke publicly about the destructive effects of chemical fertilizers and the need for more research on organic ones.⁸³ While there are concerns amongst organic farmers about the industrialization of organic production under government control, these are timely reminders that the picture drawn here is of two extreme poles at the level of discourse and there is reason to hope that dialogue between them is possible and may in practice result in combinations and compromises.

Notes

1. It is more economical for a farmer to feed his family with his own produce from his fields than to sell it and buy it in the market and, although new varieties do not keep well, they keep until the next harvest. But debt repayment, pressing expenses, or offers they can't refuse from rice merchants sometimes force them reluctantly into this option. Farmers with crops surplus to household requirements also sell, usually to merchants.
2. Inul Daratista is a Javanese popular entertainer, who in late 2002 rose to controversial Indonesia-wide prominence for her spectacular gyrating style of dance, provoking something of a moral panic reminiscent of that surrounding Elvis Presley in 1950s America. See Jessica Champagne and F.T. Millah, “Phenom-Inul,” *Latitudes*, June 2003, 14-23.
3. J.H. Boeke, *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, as Exemplified by Indonesia* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953).
4. Jean Couteau, “After the Kuta Bombing: In Search of the Balinese Soul,” *Antropologi Indonesia* 70, 2003; see also, Urs Ramseyer and I.G.R. Panji Tisna, *Bali: Living in two Worlds* (Basel: Museum der Kulturen, 2001); Thomas Reuter, ed., *Inequality, Crisis and Social Change in Indonesia: The Muted Worlds of Bali* (London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003); Raechelle Rubinstein and Linda Connor, *Staying Local in the Global Village: Bali in the Twentieth Century* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).
5. Christine Foster, personal communication, 24 December 2003. See also, UNDP, World Bank, USAID, “*Bali: Beyond the Tragedy*,” Denpasar, 2003.
6. My fieldwork in Bali since 1993 has been conducted under the auspices of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), with the local support of Udayana University (UNUD), and funded by Auckland and Massey Universities. Many of the ideas discussed here originated in discussions with my sponsor and benefactor, Dr. Nyoman Erawan of Fakultas Ekonomi UNUD, to who I am always grateful, the more so when I disagree with him. Thanks also to my friends in the rice fields around Ubud and anonymous farmers elsewhere and the pioneers of alternative agriculture named here, as well as various comrades closer to the frontline of the contest over the future of Bali, including Sherry Entus, Christine Foster, and Ngurah Karyadi. I am grateful also to several colleagues who read and commented on the paper as well as two readers for *Critical Asian Studies*.
7. Jonathan Rigg, *Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernization and Development*, 2d ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

8. Central Bureau of Statistics, cited in M. Suparmoko, "The Impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in the Rice Sector," paper presented to the Workshop on Integrated Assessment of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in the Rice Sector, Geneva, 5 April 2002, 4.
9. Roger Montgomery, Sudarno Sumarto, Sulton Mawardi, Syaikhu Usman, Nina Toyamah, Vita Febriany, and John Strain, "Deregulation of Indonesia's Interregional Agricultural Trade," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 38, no. 1 (2002): 94-95; Suparmoko, "Impact of the WTO Agreement," 7.
10. Nyoman Erawan, "Kajian Strategi Sektoral Pembangunan Bali," paper presented to public seminar organized by Fakultas Ekonomi, UNUD, Ikyana, ISEI, and Dewan Harian Daerah, no. 45, Denpasar, 12 March 2003.
11. Indonesian statistical data are not known for either reliability or consistency, but they are sufficient to indicate overall patterns and trends.
12. Respectively, Nyoman Erawan, "Pariwisata Dalam Kaitannya dengan Kebudayaan dan Kepribadian Bangsa," in *Kebudayaan dan Kepribadian Bangsa*, ed. Tjok. Rai Sudharta, Gusti Gede Ardana, Wayan Ardhika, Wayan Geriya, Nengah Sukartha, and Nengah Medera (Denpasar: Upada Sastra, 1993), 281-99; I Komang Gede Bendesa and Sukarsa cited in I Gede Pitana, "A Letter from Tepi-siring: Agriculture in the Modernising Bali," paper prepared for Modernity in Bali Workshop, University of Wollongong, 10-11 July 1995.
13. Statistik Bali, cited in Pitana, "Letter from Tepi-siring."
14. I Ketut Nehen, cited in *ibid.*
15. Statistik Indonesia, cited in I Made Jember et al., *Faktor yang mempengaruhi pergeseran tenaga kerja sektor pertanian di Bali. Laporan Penelitian* (Denpasar: Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Udayana, 1996).
16. UNDP and World Bank, Bali, Table 1. See also Sean Foley, "Agriculture and Tourism (INS/90/021)," draft report prepared for Bali Tourism Development Plan, 1991, 20.
17. Foley, "Agriculture and Tourism," 23.
18. Menjelang PJPTII, "Pengembangan Agribisnis Temui Banyak Kendala," *Bali Post*, 4 December 2003.
19. For a discussion of land values in Bali and their relationship to rice prices, see Graeme MacRae, "The Value of Land in Bali: Land Tenure, Land Reform and Commodification," in *Inequality, Crisis and Social Change in Indonesia: The Muted Worlds of Bali*, ed. Thomas Reuter (London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003), 143-65.
20. What I refer to as the tourism economy is in fact an increasingly diverse and complex economy characterized by the monetary exchange of a wide range of goods and services, but driven by and ultimately dependent on the flow of outside funds into Bali through tourism.
21. Much harvesting of rice throughout the entire western half of Bali is now done by teams of contractors from East Java, who earn more than twice as much as they would at home.
22. J. Stephen Lansing, *Priests and Programmers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 46-47.
23. Foley, "Agriculture and Tourism."
24. For a summary of key themes, see my brief article, "Ritual, Politics and Tourism," *Inside Indonesia* 74 (2003): 22.
25. "Pasca Tragedi Kuta: Investor Lokal harus Bangkit," *Bali Post*, 15 October 2002.
26. "'Recovery' Bali hanya 'Sorak-sorai' — Belum Sentuh Kepentingan Rakyat Bali," *Bali Post*, 18 January 2003.
27. "Ida Pedanda Gede Made Gunung, Pejabat Kehilangan Rasa Malu," *Bali Post*, 18 January 2003.

28. W Juniarsa, "Festival Showcases Ancient Agrarian Roots" *Jakarta Post*, 27 March 2003.
29. This language is consistent with that used on the official website of the provincial government: www.bali.go.id.
30. Erawan, "Kajian Strategi Pembangunan."
31. Erawan, the local sponsor of my initial field research in Bali in 1993-93, has remained a friend and colleague. In 2003 he organized and accompanied me on a trip into the mountains in search of old rice varieties. Despite our divergent views on development in Bali, I am grateful to him for his support in the past as well as our more recent conversations on which parts of this paper are based.
32. Tim Perumus, "Rumusan Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan Ekonomi Propinsi Bali," draft proposal presented at a panel discussion, "Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan Ekonomi Propinsi Bali," Denpasar, 13 June 2003, 5.
33. *Ibid.*, 13-14.
34. Gorda, "Sumbangan Pemikiran" (see note 35 below).
35. Papers presented to panel discussion of "Rumusan Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan ekonomi Propinsi bali," Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Udayana, Denpasar, 1 June 2003: G.N. Gorda, "Sumbangan Pemikiran tentang Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan Ekonomi Propinsi Bali"; Putu.Gede Ardhana, "Kajian Ekonomi Pembangunan"; Wayan Ardhika, "Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan Ekonomi Bali"; Gede Suyatna, "Pokok-Pokok Bahasan terhadap Draf Rumusan Pengkajian Strategi Pembangunan Ekonomi Daerah Bali"; see also, "Kurangi Ketergantungan pada Pariwisata," *Bali Post*, 13 June 2003; "Bali Perlu Industri Pengolahan Hasil Pertanian," *Bali Post*, 25 August 2003.
36. "Agroindustri akan untuk Mengentaskan Kemiskinan," *Bali Post*, 3 September 1993; "Dari Seminar Usaha Agrobisnis di NTB (2): Agrobisnis, Petani dan Subsidi," *Bali Post*, 21 December 1993; "Pengembangan Agrobisnis di Petang Terbantur Jalan," *Bali Post*, 31 January 1994; "Forum Bisnis 'Peluang Agrobisnis di Bali' (1): Setiap Orang Dikelilingi Peluang," *Bali Post*, 29 April 1994.
37. Anggito Abimanyu, "Impact of Agriculture Trade and Subsidy Policy on the Macroeconomy, Distribution, and Environment in Indonesia: A Strategy for Future Industrial Development," *The Developing Economies* 38, no. 4 (2000): 547-71.
38. Essentially the same contradiction was evident in Thai government policy for agriculture during the 1990s. See S. Sirisup and Hans-Dieter Kammeier, "Government Policy and Farmer's Decision-making: The Agricultural Diversification Programme for the Chao Phraya River Basin (1993-95) Revisited," in *Thailand's Rice Bowl: Perspectives on Agricultural and Social Change in the Chao Phraya Delta*, ed. Francois Molle and Thippawal Srijantr (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2003), 202.
39. She has since been elected to the national parliament.
40. I use the term "organic" more inclusively than some producers and consumers might prefer — to refer not to any particular system of certification, but the production aimed at reducing chemical residues to the minimum practicable. In practice, my position equates pretty much with abstaining from the use of artificial/chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.
41. "Serendipity and Parsnip," *Bali Advertiser*, 2002. Available on-line at <http://www.baliadvertiser.biz/articles/greenspeak/2002/serendipity.html> (accessed 20 January 2004).
42. Thomas Reuter, *Custodians of the Sacred Mountains: Culture and Society in the Highlands of Bali* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 375.
43. This man has since left Golden Leaf and was, in mid-2004, setting up his own farm in partnership with C.V. Bening whose organic principles are more compatible with his own.

44. John Overton, "A Future in the Past? Seeking Sustainable Agriculture," in *Strategies for Sustainable Development*, ed. John Overton and Regina Scheyvens (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999).
45. The projects referred to here are the main ones I visited. There are others, including Ibu Kartini's long-standing vermiculture-based gardens in Denpasar, and Ed Dunk, an American expatriate who is growing *padi cicih* organically to prove to his neighbors that it makes economic sense. While my discussion here focuses on the significance of organic agriculture as a potentially economically viable alternative to the dominant model, I share with its proponents a belief in its advantages from health and environmental perspectives. It is worth noting also that recent research is beginning to indicate possible advantages in terms of productivity gains. See S.P. Kaler Surata, J. Stephen Lansing, I.W. Artha Artha Wiguna, and I.G.M. Oka Suprpto, "Response of Paddy to Reduction of Inorganic Fertilisers Apply [*sic*] in Bali," unpublished manuscript, 2005.
46. Foley, "Agriculture and Tourism," 14. Vandana Shiva, *The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books; Penang: Third World Network, 1991).
47. Michael Dove and Daniel Kammen, "The Epistemology of Sustainable Resource Use: Managing Forest, Swiddens and High-Yielding Variety Crops," *Human Organisation* 56, no. 1 (1997): 96; J. Stephen Lansing, James Kremer, Vanda Gerhardt, Patricia Kremer, Alit Arthawiguna, Sng Kaler Putu Surata, Suprpto, Ida Bagus Suryawan, IGusti. Arsana, Vernon Scarborough, John Schoenfelder, and Kimberly Mikita, "Volcanic Fertilisation of Balinese Rice Paddies," *Ecological Economics* 38, 2001, 383-90; Shiva, *Violence of the Green Revolution*; Lakshman Yapa, "What Are Improved Seeds? An Epistemology of the Green Revolution," *Economic Geography* 69, no. 3 (1993): 254-73.
48. Doug Porter and David Craig, "The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion Strategies in the Rise of 'Inclusive' Liberalism," *Review of International Political Economy* 11, no. 2 (2004): 399-420.
49. *Ibid.*, 402.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, 404.
52. Erawan, "Kajian Strategi Pembangunan."
53. *Ibid.*, 9-11.
54. Respectively, Ardhana, "Kajian Ekonomi Pembangunan," 7; Suyatnya "Pokok-pokok," Gorda "Sumbangan," 4.
55. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), *Indonesia*, 2001, 2. Available on-line at <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4632E/y4632e01.htm> (accessed 16 December 2003).
56. World Bank, "Urban Infrastructure Improvement in Indonesia," Press Release, no. 97/1341 (1997).
57. Jane Kelsey, "Indigenous and Peasant Farmers Mobilise in Cancun," *WTO Bulletin*, no. 2, 2003. Available on-line at <http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00080.htm> (accessed 19 November 2003).
58. *Ibid.*
59. "The Final Sacrifice," *New Zealand Herald*, 20-21 September 2003, B18.
60. Various farmers groups. Cited in Kelsey, "Farmers Mobilise."
61. Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia, KMP Philippines, Rede de Ecological Social Amigos de la Tierra Uruguay, Assembly of the Poor Thailand, Northern Peasants Federation Thailand, Focus on the Global South, "Sustainable Development Is Not Possible Unless the Rights of Peasants and Small Farmers Are Guaranteed." Statement on the occasion of the Fourth Preparatory Committee Meeting for the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD), Bali, 4 June 2002. Available

on-line at <http://www.focusweb.org/publications/declarations/Balipercent20FSPI-Focuspercent20statement.htm>.

62. One of the ironies of this story is that these alternative visions, including the return to traditional methods, have been initiated by expatriates or businessman-farmers rather than by the ordinary farmers who have the most pressing need for them. I have, in mid-2004, yet to find any farmer-led initiatives in Bali, but there are some in the neighboring island of Java. The reasons for this are another paper.
63. This discussion is, as a reviewer for *Critical Asian Studies* pointed out, "rather light" in terms of the substantial literature on trade and development issues, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). My point however is not to critique PRSPs but simply to highlight the parallels between the sets of contradictions inherent in current global development orthodoxies and in specific policy direction for Indonesian agriculture.
64. Dove and Kammen, "Epistemology," 92.
65. Ibid.
66. Graeme MacRae, "Economy, Ritual and History in Balinese Tourist Town," PhD diss. (University of Auckland, 1997), 421-25.
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